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IMPLEMENTING CURRENT THEORIES OF JURISDICTION,
VENUE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS-
PROPOSALS FOR REVISION OF THE OHIO STATUTESt
RICHARD S. MILLER*
Professor Miller examines the policies which should underlie
jurisdictional, venue, and service requirements, and makes spe-
cific statutory recommendations to better effectuate these poli-
cies in Ohio, in particular to avoid the defeat of meritorious
claims on procedural grounds and to provide most equitably
for the convenience of both plaintiffs and defendants.
As the substantive law governing the relations among members
of society grows in quantity and complexity, the urgency of simpli-
fying the means of invoking and applying that law becomes more
apparent. For, to the extent that substantive laws are designed to
implement important societal objectives and policies, obstacles in
the way of simple and even-handed application impede the attain-
ment of these goals. Furthermore, such obstacles are likely to give
rise to popular dissatisfaction with the judicial system.
Such truisms-which were forcefully brought home to the
bench and bar of the United States as early as 1904 by Roscoe
Pound'-have resulted in major reforms which have brought about,
and are still bringing about, modernization, liberalization and even
simplification of practice and procedure in the federal courts2 and
in many state courts." Ohio, however, has seemed to lag behind
t Research for this paper was sponsored by the Ohio Legal Center Institute. The
views expressed here are the author's; they do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
the Ohio Legal Center Institute.
0 Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. I wish to thank
Raymond J. Posgay and Charles J. Kegler for their assistance in gathering the materlhls
for this paper and for their useful suggestions. My thanks also go to my colleague,
Professor Robert L. Wills, for reading the manuscript and providing helpful comments.
' See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction wvoih the Administration of
Justice, A GOLDEN ANNVERSARY REPRINT TO PRoMoTE THE EvvICIENT ADMINS.
TRATIoN or JuSnTcE, (Am. Judic. Soc. 1956).
2 See FED. R. CIM. P. in J. MOORE & H. FINK, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIC9--
RULES AND OFFIcAL FORMS AS AMENDED (1966).
3 See, e.g., N. Y. CIVIL PRAcTIcE LAW & RULES (1962); ILLINOIS CIV. PRAC,
AcT, SMITH-HURD ILLiNoIs ANNOTATED STATUTES, ch. 110 (1964); M i, Gm.
C. R. of 1963 and MIcH. REv. JUDIc. ACT of 1961. See generally Elliot, Improvmens
in Judicial Administration, 1906-1956, THE ADMINISTRATIoN OF JUSTICE IN RETRO-
SPECT 42 (Harding ed. 1957), and Scott, Pound's Influence on Civl Procedure, 78
HARv. L REV. 1568 (1965).
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other States in this area, particularly in regard to tle application
of rules of jurisdiction over the person, venue and service of proc-
ess, the subjects of this paper.4 Application is emphasized, since by
and large the rules themselves are not particularly illiberal. More
often than not it seems to be the wooden and excessively technical
or restrictive application of the rules to concrete cases which tends
to cut off the colorable substantive rights of a litigant. Whether
such applications are occasioned by the requirements of statutory
interpretation,5 by insistence upon the strict logic of stare decisis,0
by the "sporting theory" of litigation, or by other considerations1
the fact remains that some recent decisions of the Ohio courts in
this area seem to be terribly harsh and inconsiderate of substantive
rights. Perhaps Ohio is seriously handicapped in reforming its
rules of procedure by the absence of a central judicial rule-making
4 See generdly OmIo REv. CODE ANN. chs. 2305, 2307, 2311 and 2703 (Page
1953) which contain most of the statutes relating to these subjects.
'Center v. St. Petefs Episcopal Church, 11 Ohio St.2d 64, 227 NE..2d 599
(1967) (Plaintiff failed to comply with technical requirements of service. The
supreme court affirmed a judgment quashing service and refusing to allow process to
be amended to conform to statute, although defendants must have received actual notice.
The court said: "The statutory method of service of process upon a corporation is man-
datory and must be followed strictly,' 11 Ohio St.2d at 68, 227 N.E.2d at 601
(1967)); Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St.2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966) (failure of
plaintiff to have defendant served by sheriff of county in which defendant resided re-
quired dismissal, even though defendant received residence service;, savings statute held
inapplicable where defendant was not properly served); Krabill v. Gibbs, 9 Ohio
App.2d 310, 224 N.E.2d 365 (1967) (mail notice to defendant held defective and
service quashed even though defendant apparently received summons through the
mails); Hayslip v. Conrad Produce, Inc., 10 Ohio Misc. 155, 226 NE.2d 839 (C.P.
1967) (demurrer to plaintiff's petition in motor vehicle accident case sustained where
plaintiff brought suit against non-resident defendant in venue permitted under general
long-arm statute but not included as a proper county in earlier statute dealing only
with actions for injuries caused by motor vehicle); Farley v. Head, 11 Ohio Misc. 255,
N.E.2d 849 C.P. 1966) (action dismissed where plaintiff mistakenly brought suit in
county of improper venue); Baldine V Klee, 10 Ohio Misc. 203, 224 N.E.2d 544 (C.P.
1965) (service of summons quashed were summons failed to state hte nature of the
relief sought, even though a copy of the petition was served with the summons); Baldine
v. Klee, 10 Ohio Misr. 203, 224 N.E.2d 550 (C.P. 1966) (savings statute held inappli-
cable to extend statute of limitations where, by virtue of defective summons in the
original suit, plaintiffs failed to get jutisdictios over defendants within the limitations
period). See also cases dted id. at 216-17, 224 N.E.2d at 555.
. d.
'Res judicata, for example. LaBarbera v. Batsch, 10 Ohio St. 2d 106, 227 N.E.2d
55 (1967).
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authority for all state courts.3 But even before such authority is
created 9 the legislature has power to make changes which clearly
and unequivocally favor the rights of litigants over the "rules of
the game." Indeed, the purpose of this article is to propose some
statutory changes in the areas of jurisdiction, venue and process
designed to make the loss of substantive rights in these areas less
likely by taking advantage of enlightened current theory of the
purposes these procedural instruments are supposed to serve. Part
I contains a discussion of these topics more or less theoretically
and suggests some approaches in general terms. In Part II concrete
recommendations are set forth for statutory amendments and
additions. Commencement of suit by attachment and garnishment,
quasi-in-rem and in rem, will not be covered in this article. 10
I. THEORIES OF JURISDICTION, VENUE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
A. In General
Issues of jurisdiction of the person, venue and service of process
arise in the context of claims relating either to the authority of a
court to hear and decide a case or to the enforceability of a judicial
judgment. The English and early American development of the
conditions to the exercise of judicial authority provide an interest-
ing chapter in the annals of the common law. The rules of venue,
relating to the geographical situs of the suit, required initially that
a law suit be tried in the county where the wrongful act was al-
leged to have occurred, so that jury members could decide the case
"Each common pleas court may promulgate its own rules of practice, Cassidy v.
Glossip, 12 Ohio St.2d 17, 22, 231 N.E.2d 64, 69 (1967), but, aside from the Ohio
legislature, there is no central agency which has the authority to impose uniform rules
of practice on all trial courts in the state. See 40 OHIO BAR 328 (1967).
Recent uniform rules of procedure for traffic courts in Ohio were adopted by the
Ohio Supreme Court pursuant to legislative authority. OHIO REV. CODII ANN. §.
2935.17, 2937.46 (Page 1953). See 40 OHIO BAR 1434-51 (1967).
' A "Modern Courts Resolution" encompassing reform of the judicial system In.
eluding provision for central rule-making authority has passed the Ohio House of
Representatives, SuB. HousE J. R. 42 (1967), and a similar resolution will come before
the Senate in the January, 1968 session. 40 OHIO BAR 327 (1967). If it passes the
Senate the resolution will appear as a constitutional amendment on the May or No.
vember ballot.
' As a result of the passage of expansive long-arm statutes, a good argument can
be made for abolishing or limiting the use of attachment and garnishment as a basis
for acquiring jurisdiction quasi-in-rem. See Hazard, A G;r.neral Theory of State-(ourt
Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. Cr. REv. 241; Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. R1iv. 303 (1962); Note, 50 CALIF. L. RIM. 735 (1962).
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upon their own personal knowledge of the facts.11 Service of proc-
ess often involved the presentation of a writ-an order from higher
authority-to the sheriff directing him to arrest the defendant and
bring his body into court so that he might answer the charges
against him 2-this, of course, being consistent with the view that
the court's jurisdictional authority rested upon physical power over
the defendant.'3 Jurisdictional power was further limited by the
territorial theory; with few exceptions, a court could only exercise
its authority by judgment with respect to persons or property phy-
sically located within the territory served by the court.14 Of course,
these relatively primitive concepts have undergone substantial
change; juries no longer decide cases upon their own knowledge
of the facts nor are they permitted to do so; 15 jurisdiction can at-
tach without bringing defendant physically into court; 16 and judg-
ments against persons or entities outside the territory of the State
in which the court is sitting are valid and may be enforced in any
State if due process of law has been served.' 7 As a result of these
changes both the objectives of and the restraints upon service, per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue have undergone a corresponding
change and modernization. The major purpose of venue is to pro-
vide a fair and convenient geographical location for trial within
the borders of a jurisdiction, usually a State, in which jurisdiction
over the defendant or his property has been acquired.' 8 While
convenience to defendant rather than plaintiff is usually empha-
sized, and while the location of witnesses-the place where the
cause of action arose-may also be an important factor, there are
few limitations on the locations which the legislature may estab-
' See L PLucKNErr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THn COMMON LAW 127-9 (Sth
ed. 1956); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jursdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 300-303 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Ehrenzweig]; cf. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (No. 8411) (CC D. Va.
1811).
W. BLUmE, AmERICAN Civil PROCEDURE 274 (1955).
' See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917), where Mdr. Justice Holmes
said that "'the foundation of judisdiction is physical power .... "
" See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 621
(1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMES].
21 See JAMES at 238-9.
" See JAMES at 622.
' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945); Milliken r.
Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940); JAMES at 621-44.
" See Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 IcH. L REV.
307, 331 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Stevens] and see generally Ehrenzweig passim.
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lish as proper venues.10 The major purpose of service is to give
defendant notice of the action and a reasonable opportunity to
defend.20 Except possibly in cases of jurisdiction based upon tran-
sient presence of defendant or his property, 21 service is not really
a device to bring defendant within the jurisdiction, nor is it a
separate basis of jurisdiction. Rather, it is merely a condition to
the exercise of jurisdiction based on other grounds-minimum con-
tacts, domicile-and the specific method used is irrelevant so long
as it is "reasonably calculated" to fulfill its major purpose.2 2 Lastly,
the rules of personal jurisdiction need only insure that there exists
sufficient relationship between the defendant and the State so that
entry of judgment affecting the rights of the defendant will not
offends notions of "fair play and substantial justice"-due process
of law.23 Due process, in turn, is essentially a question of fairness
and convenience to the parties-especially the defendant-and only
secondarily, if at all, a matter of inherent limitations on a State's
territorial authority.24 Thus, personal jurisdiction bears some re-
semblance to venue, although the former mainly governs the allo-
cation of judicial business among States and is governed by the due
process clause of the federal constitution, while the latter treats of
intra-state allocations and has so far been a matter governed mainly
by State statute.
The rehearsal of these developments-which are too well re-
ported elsewhere to require elaboration here25-suggests the possi-
t, See Stevens.
See JAMES at 649-53. Cf. Shilling v. Octavio, 176 Ohio St. 123, 198 N.E,2d 52
(1964).
' Compare Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950)
th Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
See JAMEs at 649-53.
= International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945) is, of course, the
leading case; cf. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court JurLsdiction, 1965 Sup.
CT. REv. 241.
2' Id. Cf. RESTATBME (SEcOND) of CONFLIcr OF LAws § 24, comment b at
133-35 (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, 1967); Ehrenzweig at 312-14; Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of the State
Courts, 25 U. On. L. REv. 569 (1958); Note, Developments in the Law-State.
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960).
While the decision in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 (1958), seemed to
reestablish territorial limits on the judicial power of states a la Pennoyer v. Neff, It
is not at all dear that this retreat will be more than a temporary set-back for a theory
of jurisdiction based mainly on convenience and fairness. See Hazard, supra note 23,
at 243-44, 274; cf. Briggs, Jurisdiction by Statute, 24 OHIo ST. L. J. 223 (1963).
25 See sources cited notes 10-24 supra. See also Von Mehren & Trautman, Juri-
diction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
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bility of developing a relatively simple scheme along the following
lines:
(1) Jurisdictional reach over defendants would be broadened
to the maximum permitted by the due process clause of the
United States Constitution;
(2) Within a State, suits might be brought in any location
which, under the facts of the particular case, would prove to
be a fair and convenient place for trial;
(3) Any method of service designed to fulfill the constitu-
tional requirements of adequate notice would be permitted, the
specific method used being left to the option of the plaintiff.
No summons would ever be quashed or suit dismissed if plain-
tiff could prove that the method used-however unusual--was
reasonably calculated to give defendant notice of the suit and
an opportunity to defend or that defendant actually received
credible notice of the action in time to prepare an ansver and
to defend. The technical details of service, limitations upon the
power of a sheriff or other officer to serve, and the technical
requirements of the return of service would become unim-
portant; failure to comply with them would rarely prove fatal,
although certain presumptions of validity or correctness would
attach if prescribed procedures were followed.
(4) Either party could file a "motion to the geography," ask-
ing for a dismissal or transfer of the case to a more convenient
location within or outside the State. Such motion would en-
compass constitutional objections to the place of suit-jurisdic-
tion-matters going to convenience or fair trial but not raising
constitutional questions-venue and forum non conveniens-,
or both. The judge would not be permitted to dismiss the suit
unless jurisdiction was dearly improper or unless it was brought
in an improper or inconvenient place primarily to harass the
opposite party. Rather, he would either retain the suit for trial
or transfer to a more convenient forum. Actual costs, including
attorney's fees, might be assessed against either party to compen-
sate for hardship to the other, in such amount as the court
deemed fair in the circumstances.
Obviously, there are in Ohio some problems attendant upon
the adoption of such a program. Foremost are the political prob-
lems of extending jurisdiction beyond the fairly expansive range
which has recently been adopted,26 and of wrenching some en-
trenched concepts27 from their all too secure foundations of tradi-
. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Page 1953), the "long-an" statute. See
Seilon, Inc. v. Brema S. p. A. 271 Supp. 516 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Note, Juridiction
Under New Ohio "Long-Arm" Stautae-Problems ol Interpretation and Application,
35 U. CN. I. REv. 157 (1966); Note, Ohio's Long-Arm Statute, 15 CLU..MAR.
L. REV. 363 (1966).
' See cases dted note 5 supra.
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tion. There is also the problem that in the absence of inter-state
compacts, one State has not the power to transfer a case to the
courts of another State-the kind of power possessed by federal
judges in inter-district transfers.28 Nonetheless, it may still be pos-
sible, by revising the existing statutory framework, and without ex-
panding too far the legislative policies already present in that frame-
work, to accomplish some of the objectives encompassed in the
suggested scheme. The following general recommendations are so
directed.
First, rules of service, venue and jurisdiction ought always to
be construed liberally to effectuate their major contemporary pur-
poses. 29 While an argument can be made that statutes creating or
changing substantive rights in conflict with traditional common law
rules ought to be narrowly construed in order to protect well-
entrenched popular expectations, there is little to be said for apply-
ing the same rule of construction to procedural rules. Few people
base their conduct upon beliefs as to where and in what manner
they will be sued; those who do often have recourse to legal advice
well before they act. Furthermore, statutes providing expanded
methods of achieving jurisdiction and establishing venue are not
necessarily in derogation of the common law, but on the contrary
are more in consonance with what recent important scholarship
expresses as the pre-Pennoyer v. Neff common law view that con-
venience was a more important consideration than mere physical
power.30 In addition, the doctrinal pedant should find no difficulty
in labeling rules of service, jurisdiction and venue as remedial,
and thus entitled to be liberally construed.'
= 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1965).
:' Under current Ohio law remedial laws are to be "liberally construed in order
to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice." O-no Ruv. CoDn
ANN. § 1.11 (Page 1953). However, by holding that strict complicance with a particu-
lar procedural statute is a matter of jurisdiction, or that the technical requircments
of a procedural statute are mandatory, the courts have managed to side-step the re-
quirements of a liberal construction. See cases cited note 5 cupra, particularly Baldina
v. Klee, 10 Ohio Misc. 203, 207-08, 224 N.E.2d 544, 548 (C.P. 1965), But sed Shilling
v. Octavio, 176 Ohio St 123, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1964).
"See Ehrenzweig, supra note 11.
21 Cf. State ex rel. Holdridge v. Industrial Cornm'n, 11 Ohio St,2d 175, 228
N.E.2d 621 (1967), O'Mara v. Alberto-Culver Co., 215 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio C, P.
1966) (holding the long-arm statute remedial and therefore entitled to be applied in
cases which arose before the statute was passed). But cf. Bruney v. Little, 8 Ohio Misc.
393, 222 N.E.2d 446 (1966) (holding the long-arm statute part remedial and part
substantive and not entitled to retroactive application).
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Second, when general rules of service, jurisdiction or venue
applicable to all actions co-exist with special rules applicable to
particular actions, both the general rule and the special rule should
be available to establish service, jurisdiction or venue unless the
special rule by its own terms is expressly made exclusive. Venue
provisions for specific actions are spread throughout the Ohio Code,
while general venue provisions are gathered together in a single
chapter. Because the Code itself is silent as to which provision
should govern in the event that both a specific and general provi-
sion seem to apply, a contrary rule creates a trap for the unwary.
This problem is illustrated by the recent case of Hayslip v. Conrad
Produce, Inc.32 There the plaintiff brought a property damage ac-
tion arising out of a collision between a tractor-trailer owned by
plaintiff and a truck owned by a non-resident defendant corpora-
tion, in the county of plaintiff's residence pursuant to the venue
provision of the Ohio "long-arm" statute. The court sustained de-
fendant's demurrer for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that venue
should have been laid in the county where the accident occurred,
pursuant to section 4515.01 of the OHIO REVISED CODE, which
specifically deals with "venue in actions for injury caused by motor
vehicles." The court reasoned that the legislature, in passing the
"long-arm" statute, did not intend "to repeal or modify the specific
provision contained in section 4515.01, Revised Code, with respect
to venue in automobile accident cases." Be that as it may, however,
there was likewise no indication from the legislature that it in-
tended the newer venue provision to be inapplicable to such cases,
or that it intended section 4515.01 to remain the exclusive cri-
terion for venue. Certainly, the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws who drafted the long-arm statute (but not the venue provi-
sion) did not contemplate that it would be inapplicable to in-
state auto accidents involving non-resident defendants. 33 The result
of the decision, however, is that plaintiff's cause is thrown out of
court by reason of an honest misinterpretation which any attorney
might make. While the plaintiff in Hayslip may be able to recom-
mence suit in the proper county, the statute of limitations might
" 10 Ohio Misc. 155, 226 N.E.2d 839 (1967).
" See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
PROcEEDINGS 220-25 (1962) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
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act as a bar to recommencement in other similar cases.3 4 It may be
conceded, as the court reasoned, that the county of plaintiff's resi-
dence may be a "strange forum" for defendant to be sued in, al.
though it is difficult to understand why it is any stranger than the
county through which he happened to be driving when the acci-
dent occurred. Also, the county of plaintiff's residence may be in-
convenient from the point of view of the location of the witnesses
or the premises, even though this may not ordinarily be deter-
mined until the parties present the facts. But the more appropriate
approach would be to uphold venue under either provision and
permit transfer to a more convenient forum "for the convenience
of parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice" if serious
inconvenience or unfairness to defendant could be shown. 5
Third, technical defects in serving process, acquiring jurisdic-
tion of persons or property or selecting venue ought not to result
in the dismissal of a lawsuit or the invalidation of a judgment once
rendered unless the defect is of sufficient magnitude to violate an
important constitutional or statutory right. Pre- and post-judgment
amendments to correct technical mistakes or omissions in process
or jurisdictional allegations should be freely allowed, mainly for
the purpose of correcting the record. 0 But no suit should be dis-
missed or judgment avoided for some uncorrected technical error
which has no bearing on the rights of the parties or the effective
administration of justice. 7
Fourth, all statutes dealing with service, venue and jurisdic-
tion of persons and property should be consolidated into chapters
dealing generally with all civil actions.88 Special provisions in code
chapters dealing with specific causes of action, such as the automo-
bile venue provision, section 4515.01, OHio REViSED CODE, construed
" In Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St.2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966) it was held
that the savings statute, Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1953), could not
extend the statute of limitations after a dismissal not on the merits unless defendant
was effectively served with process within 60 days after plaintiff attempted to com-
mence the action. However, the statute relied on in Mason v. Waters which equated
an attempt to serve process with actual service, OHIO REV. COon ANN. § 2305.17
(Page 1953) has been amended. As a result of the amendment the plaintiff in a case
similar to Hayslp ought to be able to start over again under the savings statute. How-
ever, the effect of the amendment has not yet been judicially established.
" See pp. 146-50 infra.
3, Compare Center v. St. Peter's Episcopal Church, 11 Ohio St.2d 64, 227 N.I.2d
599 (1967).
See pp. 163-64 infra. Cf. Note, 3 COLUM. J. oF LAw & Soc. PRons. 17 (1967).
3, See pp. 134-35 infra.
[Vol. 29
OHIO STATUTES
in the Hayslip case, can lead to errors of oversight and other confu-
sion.
Fifth, statutes dealing with service, venue and jurisdiction of
person and property should be broadly drawn, consolidated, and
read in conjunction with a liberal transfer provision, so that few
highly specialized provisions for specific actions will be required.
Thus, to use the problem of the Hayslip case again as an example,
there is no reason why the service, venue and jurisdictional provi-
sions of the long-arm statute could not serve fairly and effectively
to cover automobile torts where defendants are non-residents, or
why separate provisions for motor vehicle accidents are required.
Special provisions should be reserved only for situations where im-
portant policies call for a different approach to these problems.
On the whole, the need for detailed venue provisions to cover
every situation is lessened substantially by the ease of transporta-
tion and communication between counties within the State and by
the availability of depositions in lieu of oral testimony in appro-
priate cases.39 Special provisions will become even less important
if a statute is adopted providing for transfer to a more convenient
forum when hardship or unfairness would otherwise result.40
Sixth, in order to insure that substantive rights are not
jeopardized by errors in securing service, laying venue or securinE
jurisdiction over persons or property, the savings statute41 should
be amended to permit a plaintiff whose action has been finally
dismissed for any of these errors to recommence his suit in the
proper county or in the proper manner within a reasonable time
after the dismissal has been communicated to him. Such recom-
mencement should be permitted in cases where the plaintiffs at-
torney was negligent as well as in cases where the error was the
result of an honest mistake. In order to overcome any claim of
hardship to defendants, however, the plaintiff should be charged
with defendant's costs of seeking a dismissal and the costs of answer-
ing to the new action, including reasonable attorney's fees. Only in
cases where plaintiff is shown to have brought the suit improperly
in order to harass the defendant should the savings clause be un-
available to salvage plaintiff's case.42
As a result of the advent of "long-arm" statutes, the broadened
OHiO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2319.06 ,Page 1953).
See pp. 148-49 infra.
a Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1953).
See pp. 137-38 infra.
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savings clause should be construed to permit recommencement of
a suit in Ohio within the savings period even where the first suit
was brought in another State.481 Thus, for example, a Pennsylvania
citizen who brings a suit in Pennsylvania against an Ohio citizen
honestly but mistakenly believing the Pennsylvania long-arm statute
to be applicable, should not be barred by the Ohio statute of
limitations if his Pennsylvania suit is later dismissed because the
Pennsylvania statute cannot constitutionally be used to reach the
Ohio defendant. Instead he should have the Ohio savings period
within which to recommence his suit properly in Ohio. Hopefully,
Pennsylvania will reciprocate for Ohio plaintiffs.
All of this may seem to some to be overly solicitous to plain-
tiffs whose lawyers make mistakes in commencing suit. However,
it must be remembered that because of the vagueness of con-
temporary interpretations of due process even the best lawyer
may not be able to tell in advance whether jurisdiction over the
non-resident will be sustained under the Constitution.44 In addi.
tion, it has long ceased to be appropriate for lawyers to treat litiga-
tion as a game where either party may win as a result of a techni-
cal error committed by the other's attorney. The policy that "there
must be an end to litigation" should be tempered by fairness and
common sense. 45 The public is not likely to tolerate for long any-
" It has already been construed to allow recommencement in state court where
the original action was brought in the federal courts and dismissed for lack of diversity
of citizenship. Wasyk v. Trent, 174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.B.2d 58 (1963). See Note,
33 U. GIN. L. Rnv. 113 (1964). However, savings statutes of this type have usually
been held inapplicable where suit is first brought in a sister state. Id. at 116. Cf. Bur-
nett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, (1964) (recommencement of 1MIA
action in federal court allowed after dismissal in Ohio state court for improper venue).
' See Note, Extraterritorial In Personam Jurisliction: The Substantiva Due Process
Requirement, 13 KAN. L. RIv. 554 (1965). When the lack of predsion in the con-
stitutional criteria for due process is taken together with the absence of clear standards
in the long-arm statute itself, the difficulty of predicting in advance whether jurisdiction
will stick in a particular case creates a serious problem even for the most knowledge,
able practitioner. That this problem actually exists is borne out by the unusually high
number of jurisdictional dismissals which regularly find their way into the advance
sheets.
" The objectives of statutes of limitations are not simply to end the possibility of
litigation and put defendant's mind at ease or to protect the interests of persons who
deal with the defendant. They are also designed to protect the defendant against having
to defend a case when the witnesses cannot be located or identified because of the
passage of time or when their memories have faded. However, the law has never been
seriously concerned with faded memories or unavailable witnesses when the suit has
been commenced within the limitations period, even though several years pass before
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thing less. Any hardship or difficulty caused by lengthening the
time within which suit can be brought can be overcome more fairly
by assessing costs and attorney's fees and by permitting the taking of
depositions to preserve testimony, than by dismissing for technical
reasons the action of a plaintiff who believes that on the merits he
has a just cause. Nor does an action of malpractice against the
plaintiff's attorney provide an adequate remedy, since errors can
be made honestly and non-negligently and, even if negligence is
present, the client is not likely to learn of it.
B. Process"0
Although service of process (or other manner of giving no-
tice) may be constitutionally required as a condition to the existence
of power to render an enforceable decision, the basis of jurisdic-
tion upon which that power rests must exist independently of serv-
ice; it is elemental that serving process upon a defendant will not
confer jurisdiction over that defendant or his property unless he
or his property are present within the State, he is domiciled within
the state, he consents or he has other contact with the State suf-
ficient to satisfy the requirements of International Shoe and its
progeny.47 The major purpose of process is simply the fulfillment
of constitutional requirements of notice of suit-apprising the de-
fendant that he is being sued, and giving him an opportunity to
defend.48 Rules relating to service of process, however, have often
been used to accomplish other purposes, such as determining
it comes to trial. The reason, presumably, is because the defendant has been notified
of suit early enough to begin to marshal his evidence and his witnesses and possibly
to perpetuate testimony, or take depositions, before witnesses disappear or memories
fade. It would be consistent with this latter reason to allow the savings statute to
operate where defendant receives credible notice of a law suit within the limitations
period (including the one year extension for service granted where plaintiff filed his
suit within the limitations period, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.17 (Page 1953))
even though there is a failure to comply with the strict requirements of the statutes
dealing with commencement, process, service or return of service. Cf. Burnett v. New
York Cent. RYL, 380 U.S. 424, 428-30 (1964); Callahan, Statutes of Limitations-
Background, 16 Omo ST. LJ. 130 (1955).
See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950); Mitliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Sunderland, The Problem of Jurisdic-
tion, 4 TEx. L REV. 429, 439-449 (1926); Comment, Personal Service of Process-An
Outdated Concept, 28 U. Pirrr. L REV. 319 (1966).
4 See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause, and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L REV. 569 (1958); Note, Developments in
the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960).
" See JAmEs at 649-53.
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venue,49 or controlling the territorial authority of sheriffs and
other officers.50 But, from the point of view of simplicity, con-
venience and fairness, these other purposes could be better served
by statutes and rules dealing expressly with venue and the authority
of sheriffs. Eliminating these considerations from the statutes deal-
ing with service of process would permit concentration exclusively
upon state and federal constitutional requirements. And, if rules
requiring strict construction of process requirements were also re-
jected, a relatively simple, understandable and easily applied statu-
tory framework might be developed, as follows.
1. Contents
Summons issued by State courts need contain only constitu-
tionally required captions, seals and signatures plus the name of
the plaintiff or plaintiffs, the designation of the court, the name
of defendants, the nature and amount of the claim (both of which
might be satisfied by attaching a copy of the petition), and the
date by which the defendant must respond or suffer a default
judgment. Apart from specific constitutional requirements, the
precise wording of the summons should be of no consequence so
long as it, together with the attached petition, substantially pro-
vides the listed information.51
2. Territorial limitations upon service
Summons issued out of a court in one county should be effec-
tive to serve defendants anywhere in the State and, indeed, if juris-
diction is based upon a relationship with the State other than
mere presence of the defendant in the State, anywhere in the
world.62
3. Effect of actual notice
Irregularities in service or, indeed, failure of service (such as
service by an unauthorized official or service of an incomplete or
improperly worded summons) should never defeat jurisdiction if
the defendant had sufficient contacts with the State to otherwise
- See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.39 (Page 1953) (venue proper where dc-
fendant summoned). The Ohio statutes also create a difficult situation where the valid-
ity of summons depends on the propriety of venue, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.04
(Page 1953).
Cf. Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St.2d 212, 217 N.X.2d 213 (1966).
" See pp. 163-64 infra.
" See p. 165 infra. See MIcH. GEN. CT. R. of 1963, R. 105.9 which provides,
in part: "There is no territorial limitation on the range of service of .. .notice."
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establish jurisdiction and if defendant had actual, credible, notice
of the suit and a reasonable opportunity to defend5 s Here the
burden of proving actual, credible notice, where official service
failed or was defective, should rest with the plaintiff.
4. Mode of service
Service could be made in any manner reasonably calculated to
give defendant notice and an opportunity to defend. Various
methods would include, at plaintiff's option, personal service 4 by
an authorized official or a disinterested adult, leaving at defendant's
usual place of residence, registered or certified mail to places of
usual residence or usual place of business or, in certain situations
where defendant's address was unknown and undiscoverable in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, publication alone. In addition,
plaintiff should be permitted to use other, more unusual, methods,
such as telegraph or telephone, with the court's permission if good
cause can be shown. Special presumptive weight, however, might
be given to the return of service of a sheriff, his appointee, or other
qualified officer, while the return of a private person should be made
under oath.55
C. Venue
In spite of widespread acceptance of the much-mooted distinc-
tion between venue-a privilege to sue or be sued in a particular
locality56-and jurisdiction-the power of a court to hear and de-
termine a case on its merits,57 there is good reason to question its
viability. First, Ohio courts have frequently tended to confuse the
two concepts by attaching jurisdictional consequence to defects of
venue.53 Second, to the extent that a court must dismiss a case on
' See Sunderland, The Problem of Jurisdiction, 4 TM. L REV. 429, 443-9 (1926).
This would all but eliminate special appearances to attack technical defects in service
since a special appearance would ordinarily indicate that defendant had actual, credible
notice of the suit.
"' See Comment, Personal Service of Process-An Outdated Concept, 28 U. Prrr.
L REv. 319 (1966). The author suggests that personal, in-hand, service is outmoded
and should be replaced routinely by certified mail.
" See text infra pp. 166, 171-72.
See generally Ehrenzweig; Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure,
49 McH. L. REv. 307 (1951).
' Cf. Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 308 US. 165 (1939); Loftus v.
Pennsylvania RKR., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N.E. 94 (1923), petition for trit of error
dismissed, 266 U.S. 639 (1924).
Although there are also differences between "subject matter" jurisdiction and
"personal" jurisdiction, both as to definition and ability to waive, there is no need to
refer to those well-known differences for the purpose of this discussion.
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motion because of improper venue as established by legislative
fiat, that court has no "power" to hear and determine the case. The
consequences, except perhaps for the right to collaterally attack the
judgment, may be exactly the same as if the court lacked juris-
diction. And where, as in Ohio, the courts expressly denominate
improper venue in certain actions as a jurisdictional defect, 0 a
more traditional difference-that objections to venue may be
waived if not properly raised while jurisdictional defects may not-
may be dispensed with60 and a judgment rendered in an improper
venue subjected to collateral attack. 61 This confusion may sug-
gest that the "power-privilege" distinction is inaccurate, useless and
perhaps dangerous as a conceptual tool, constituting a trap for the
unwary which ought to be discarded. Alternatively, the rules of
venue might be altered and clarified, at the very least to make
them coincide more closely with what they really are-legislative
determinations of the most fair and convenient place for suit. On
rare occasions the location of suit may be a matter of such con-
cern to the legislature as to lead it to withdraw decisional power
from courts other than those in specific locations.6 2 Perhaps in such
cases the legislature should expressly withdraw jurisdiction of the
subject matter-competence-from courts in all other localities. The
statutes accomplishing this purpose should be removed from the
venue section and included in the chapter dealing with the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the courts or the chapter which creates
the cause of action, if a statutory claim, and should be worded in
terms which unequivocably demonstrate the jurisdictional nature
of the rule, e.g.:
No court other than a court located in X county shall have
power to entertain a civil suit involving a claim against ........
............................ to recover ...................................... .or to enter a
' See generally Wills, The Effect of Improper Venue Upon Jurisdictlon of the
Person and Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter, 11 OHIO ST. L. J. 291 (1950).
Id.
See Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Hollenberger, 76 Ohio St. 177, 81 NRI, 184
(1907), discussed in Wills, supra note 58.
6 RESTATmENT, JuDGEmENTS § 11 (1942).
82 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5501.18 (Page 1964), which limits
venue in actions against the director of highways to Franklin County or, in an action




judgment in such suit, and any judgment therein shall be
void.
Having thus withdrawn truly jurisdictional rules from the section
dealing with venue,63 the legislature should then deal with its venue
provisions in a manner designed to accomplish their legitimate pur-
pose.
As already mentioned, venue in its accepted contemporary
meaning is simply a legislative determination that certain localities
are the appropriate places for trial of certain classes of cases. Gen-
erally speaking "appropriateness" is and should be determined by
a careful legislative balancing of the convenience of the parties,
witnesses and the courts in cases of each general class.64 It must be
recognized, however, that actual controversies may present circum-
stances in which the legislatively established venue becomes a most
inconvenient place for the trial of a particular lawsuit. Such in-
convenience may impose an undue burden upon one or both
parties, the witnesses or the trial court. For this reason the legisla-
ture should permit suits to be brought in or transferred to localities
other than those expressly enumerated in the venue statutes when
serious inconvenience to the plaintiff, to the defendant, or to the
witnesses would follow from suit in a specified county and if suit
in the non-specified locality would not unduly burden the court or
cause serious inconvenience to the opposite party.6 5 Furthermore,
one factor which might be considered in determining whether to
transfer to a non-specified county is the extent of calendar conges-
tion and delay in reaching trial in the forum and in other courts.66
Abuse of a transfer provision might be avoided, first, by pro-
viding for the payment of costs of transfering the case to a proper
0
'No attempt has been made in this artide to locate and deal with such venue
rules. In the absence of legislative action making such rules exclusive, plaintiff would
be able to use the general venue rules as well as the specific section if the revision
proposed here were adopted.
"4 Occasionally, venue statutes may unduly favor the convenience of one kind of
party-perhaps local residents or special interest groups-over another. Should such
discrimination create serious hardship or unfairness to the non-favored party, a
constitutional claim may be asserted. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945) (convenience to parties a factor in determining whether due process
has been served); B. Currie, The Constitution and the 'Transitory" Cause of Action,
73 HARv. L R v. 36, 268 (1959) in SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS
283 (1963).
" See text infra, pp. 147-50.
See text infra pp. 149-50. Cf. Miller, A Program for the Elimination of the
Hardships of Litigation Delay, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 402, 415 (1966).
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county, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the action upon de-
fendant's motion is transferred to a locality authorized in the
statute after being brought by plaintiff in a non-specified county.07
Second, by adopting venue provisions sufficiently broad and with
sufficient choice of locality to cover most of the potentially
convenient locations.68 It must be recognized that there are some
actions in which no one county can be called the single most con-
venient place of suit, and where suit in any one county will result
in some kind of inconvenience. Thus, if an automobile accident
occurs in county A as a result of negligent repair or maintenance
in county B, and defendant resides in county C and injured plain-
tiff resides and receives extensive post emergency treatment for his
injuries in county D, witnesses may have to be drawn from all four
counties. The legislature, in this situation, might well designate
the county of defendant's residence (C), and the county or coun-
ties where any part of the cause of action arose (A or B)09 as the
counties of proper venue, leaving it for plaintiff to decide to bring
the suit in county D (not specified in the statute) if he believes
that medical testimony as to his injuries and treatment will consti-
tute a major part of the trial and, perhaps, if the injuries are
such as to prevent him or any of his key witnesses from traveling
to counties A, B, or C. The chances are, however, that unless the
prosecution of the suit in any county other than D will cause plain-
tiff serious inconvenience, he will bring suit in A, B, or C in order
to avoid the possibility of a transfer to one of those counties with
attendant costs.
The foregoing scheme, it should be noted, necessarily involves
two further recommendations which are consistent with the con-
cept of venue as a legislative generalization of convenience and
which are vital if the rules of venue are to be of assistance in
achieving justice. Places of suit which bear no necessary relation-
ship to anyone's convenience, such as the place where the de-
fendant is summoned, or some arbitrarily designated county, should
either be eliminated from the venue statutes as proper places for
suit or left as a last resort.70 Unless this is done the transfer motion
' See text infra pp. 150-51. Cf. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.20 (1967 Supp,).
,See text infra pp. 147-48.
" It is recommended that, for purposes of venue, the county where any part of
the cause of action arose be liberally interpreted to indude any county in which acdvlty
occurred which gave rise to a cause of action; even though the cause of action arose,
in a technical sense, in another county.
S' ee text infra p. 148.
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might be called into use more often than would occur if suit
were brought in a county which has a rational relationship to the
parties or action. Furthermore, unless there is no other convenient
forum there is no excuse for the inclusion of such counties as
places of proper venue. More importantly, the remedy for improper
venue, except perhaps in rare cases when bad faith and harassment
are shown, should be a transfer to a proper venue and not a dis-
missal.71
D. Jurisdiction of the Person
The recent passage of a "long-arm" statute has done much to
modernize the jurisdictional reach of Ohio courts over non-resi-
dents. 72 Two problems which remain for practitioners are: (1)
other, older statutes overlap and perhaps conflict with the provi-
sions of the long-arm statute78 and (2) the interpretation of the
statute and its application to particular cases may be subject to
doubt.74 The first factor can be dealt with effectively either by re-
pealing inconsistent jurisdictional statutes or by adopting a statu-
tory rule which requires the application, in case of a conflict, of the
statute which upholds the exercise of jurisdiction-normally the
long-arm statute.75 In either case a plaintiff's attorney would no
longer have to fear the existence of a statute with a less expansive
reach. The second factor may be a consequence of either a niggardly
judicial interpretation of legislative intent or the possibility that
the long-arm statute, as applied to a particular case, may violate de-
fendant's due process rights. Although this problem may only arise
on rare occasions, and although there are more or less cumbersome
ways of avoiding the problem-as by suing the defendant concur-
rently in a court where personal jurisdiction is clearly proper-
the danger is that an unsophisticated attorney, taking the statute at
face value, may not be aware of the existence of a problem when
he commences suit, and may not discover the dimension of his
mistake until after the limitations period has expired. Absent inter-
state compacts or federal legislation allowing transfer from one
state to another,7" there is no sure-fire way to deal with this prob-
lem. Making the Ohio "savings" statute applicable to such cases
' See text infra pp. 148-49. Cf. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.., 380 US. 424
(1965).
' OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Page 1953).
3' Cf. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2703.20 (Page 1953) (Jurisdiction over non-
resident owners or operators of motor vehicles.)
See note 44 supra.
' See text infra p. 143.
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and thus giving the plaintiff an additional period within which to
sue will not work if the plaintiff has to commence suit anew in
another state, since the full faith and credit clause does not oblige
one state to apply the statute of limitations or "savings.' statute of
another.77 A scheme with a moderate chance of success in preserv-
ing the plaintiff's rights is suggested by statutes adopted in Wis-
consin78 and recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws30 The local court can refuse to dismiss the case for lack of
personal jurisdiction unless and until the defendant waives the
statute of limitations and agrees to submit to jurisdiction and venue
in a more convenient forum in another state.80 Since constitutional
limitations on jurisdiction are based on "fair play and substantial
justice,"8' it may be argued that a defendant who refuses to accept
a reasonable opportunity to have his case tried in a convenient
forum ought not to be heard to complain if the original court in
which he is sued-however inconvenient-proceeds to hear and de-
termine the suit on the merits8 2 Of course even this device may not
help plaintiff if defendant fails to appear at all, for it may be argued
that a non-appearance in a doubtful case gives the court no power
to impose the conditions upon dismissal. But in that situation, at
least, plaintiff ought to be on notice that something is amiss-par-
ticularly if the case is worth anything and plaintiff knows that
defendant has had actual notice of the suit-and he should im-
mediately commence suit in a more appropriate forum.
II. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
A. General Provisions
1. Reorganization of Statutes
As an aid to practitioners searching for the appropriate means
of commencing suit and to avoid overlap and confusion, the statu-
tory sections dealing with service of process, venue and jurisdiction
of the person should be separated from one another but be drawn
together under a single code title and under adjacent chapters. It is
11 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 11, at 312-13.
Cf. H. GOODRICH, CONFLIcr OF LAWS 152 (1964); R3STATtMI3NT OF CON-
FLIcr OF LAwS § 603 (1934).
"' Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.19 (1967 Supp.). See also ]3HRENZW1IG AND T.OUISELL,
JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 85 (1968).
" Uniform Interstate and International Procedural Act § 1.05. This provision is
derived from the Wisconsin act, supra note 78.
"o See text infra pp. 143-46.
S International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
" See text infra pp. 145-46.
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suggested, therefore, that the general venue and jurisdiction provi-
sions, sections 2307.32 - 2307.41, and other common venue provi-
sions, such as those relating to actions in automobile accident cases,
section 4515.01, and domestic relations cases, section 3105.03, be
repealed and thus removed from the isolated titles in which they
now appear, and the new and corrected rules be enacted to appear
in Title 27.83 Bases of jurisdicition should occupy chapter 2702, and
venue chapter 2704.
2. Savings Statute
Recent applications of the Ohio savings statute8 4 have unfor-
tunately made it clear that relatively insignificant procedural errors
which prevent plaintiff from acquiring jurisdiction over the de-
fendant's person will not bring plaintiff within the benefit of the
one year extension of the statute of limitations provided by this
statute in cases where plaintiff fails "not on the merits." Thus, in
Mason v. Waters,5 where defendant's place of residence lay near
the border between two counties, plaintiff in his praecipe mis-
takenly requested the issuance of a summons to the sheriff of the
county other than the one in which defendant actually resided. This
summons was served on defendant but was subsequently quashed,
long after the statute of limitations on plaintiff's claim had run.
The trial court and the court of appeals permitted plaintiff to pro-
ceed by alias summons under the savings statute; but the Ohio
Supreme Court reversed a judgment for plaintiff on the ground
that the savings statute is inapplicable where proper service is not
achieved within the limitations period, holding that the acquisition
of personal jurisdiction is an essential condition to its application.
Subsequently, in Baldine v. Klee,86 a common pleas court followed
the reasoning of Mason v. Waters in a situation where the only de-
fect was in stating the nature of the relief sought in plaintiffs
praecipe and in the summons. The court held that plaintiff had not
"attempted to commence his action" within the limitations period
and, therefore, the dismissal of plaintiff's case was not a
"failure otherwise than on the merits" within the coverage of the
Entitled "Courts - General Provisions - Special Remedies."
HIOmo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1953). See generally Eastman &
Kane, Commencement of a Civil Action in Ohio for Application of tht Statute of Limi-
tations, 16 OIto ST. L.J. 140, 150-53 (1955).
' 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966), noted in 28 OHio ST. LJ. 558
(1967). See also Timens v. Bernard Pipe Line Co., 4 Ohio App.2d 249, 212 N.E..d
73 (1965).
S 224 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio CP. 1966).
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savings statute. In both cases defendants were actually served with
process, defective though such service might have been, within the
period of the statute of limitations. As far as constitutional due
process was concerned, defendants clearly had notice of the suits
and a reasonable opportunity to defend.87 Plaintiffs' errors con-
sisted of failure to comply strictly with purely technical statutory
requirements and, perhaps, understandable failures to act dili-
gently to correct such errors after learning that defendants were
moving to quash the summonses. There is absolutely no evidence
in either case that defendants were prejudiced by plaintiff's techni-
cal errors. Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the legisla-
ture intended the statute of limitations to bar plaintiffs' claims
where defendants get actual notice of suit, and thus have an op-
portunity to begin to marshal their evidence, before the limitations
period expires.88 Even the most meticulous attorney is likely to quail
at the prospect of having an action dismissed with prejudice upon
such technical grounds. There is strong reason, therefore, for bring-
ing cases of this nature within the protection of the savings statute.
And, since that statute is merely an extension of the statute of
limitations and clearly within the legislative prerogative, there is no
reason why jurisdiction over the person must condition its opera-
tion. Thus, in keeping with the Ohio Supreme Court's stated view
that the savings statute "is a remedial statute and is to be given
a liberal construction to permit the decision of cases upon their
' See Baldine v. Klee, 10 Ohio Misc. 203, 211, 224 N.E.2d 544, 550 (C.P. 1965).
' There is, however, something which indicates that the legislature was aware of
the problem. OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2305.17 was amended effective October 30,
1965 to provide that an action is commenced
by filing a petition in the office of the clerk of the proper court together with
a praecipe demanding that summons issue or an affidavit for service by publi-
cation, if service is obtained within one year.
This new section eliminated the language in the former section which the Ohio Supreme
Court had apparently construed to mean that there could be no attempt to commence
an action for purposes of the savings statute, unless plaintiff actually got service on
defendant within 60 days of the date of summons. C1. Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St.
2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966). The effect of the amendment may be, and hope-
fully will be, to make the savings statute applicable even where defendant has not
been properly served. Unfortunately, however, it is still possible for the court to hold,
consistently with its reasoning in Mason v. Waters, that an action cannot fail, on the
merits or otherwise, under the savings statute, unless it has been properly commenced,
and that an action under the amended provision is not commenced unless valid service
is obtained within one year after filing a praecipe and petition. See aIso Kossuth v.
Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.X.2d 285 (1954).
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merits rather than upon mere technicalities of procedure,"8 19 the
following wording of OHIO REv. CODE section 2305.19 is recom-
mended:
If in good faith plaintiff commences an action or attempts
to commence an action in any court within the limitations
period there applicable and,
(a) if the action fails,
(b) if a judgment for plaintiff is reversed, or set aside in
any direct or collateral attack,
(c) if the attempt to commence such action fails, or
(d) if the failure of such action or attempt is affirmed on
appeal in any appellate court,
and if such failure, reversal or affirmance is othenvise than upon
the merits and the time limited for the commencement of such
action at the date of failure, reversal or affirmance has expired,
the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action against the same
defendants, or if the law allows, their successors, within one year
after notice of such reversal, failure or affirmance, whichever is
the latest.
Upon motion of the defendant in the new action the court
may award such actual costs as are just, including reasonable
attorney's fees, to recompense the defendant for any expense,
hardship or inconvenience suffered as a result of plaintiff's
failure or neglect to comply with any rule of practice or pro-
cedure.
This provision shall apply to any claim asserted in any
pleading by a defendant. It shall not be necessary, in order for
this provision to apply, for the failing party to appeal from the
ruling of law or fact upon which such failure is based. A fail-
ure not on the merits shall include, but is not limited to, a de-
fective praedpe or summons, service of summons by an im-
proper officer or person, false or incorrect return of service, im-
properly laid venue, failure of subject-matter jurisdiction and
failure to subject defendant or defendants to the jurisdiction
of the court.
This section shall be construed liberally to avoid the conse-
quences of any error or defect in the proceedings which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
The "good faith" requirement in this proposed section is de-
signed only to exclude situations in which a suit has been com-
menced or an abortive attempt to commence suit has been made
without regard for the applicable rules of procedure in order to
harass or trick the defendant or delay the actual commencement
Cem Realty Corp. v. American Mrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82, 167
N.E.2d 774 (1960).
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of suit by exploiting this section. In such cases, the burden should
lie with the defendant to establish, either by showing the gross
and obvious nature of the error or by proof of plaintiff's actual
intent, that plaintiff's attempt was other than in good faith. This
exception should not be resorted to unless the court is satisfied
that good faith was not present.
The application of the section is not to be limited to failure
caused by the enumerated errors, but is to apply to any failure
caused by a procedural error not affecting the party's substantial
rights. This might well include, for example, dismissals for techni-
cal pleading errors or for misjoinder or nomjoinder of parties or
claims. In any event the section calls for a liberal construction,
and it shall no longer be necessary that plaintiff secure jurisdiction
over defendant's person before it becomes applicable.00 Plaintiff
need not appeal the adverse ruling of fact or law in order to get
the benefit of this section,91 but if he or the defendant does appeal
and plaintiff loses not on the merits at the appellate stage, the one
year extension shall run from the date that plaintiff receives notice
of his failure.92
That portion of section 2305.19 dealing with service upon a
Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St.2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966). Furthermore, it
should not make any difference whether the applicable statute of limitations is sub.
stantive or procedural. Cf. Barnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 425.30,
especially n. 2, 427 (1965). Contra, Alakiotis v. Lancione, 12 Ohio Misc., 257, 232
N.E.2d 663 (C.P. 1966).
Ordinarily this provision should not be used to allow a recommencement where
the original failure though on the merits was clearly erroneous. In such cases plain.
tiff's only recourse is to appeal the erroneous judgment before it becomes final. C1.
La Barbera v. Batsch, 10 Ohio St. 2d 106, 227 NE.2d 55, 62 (1967). But as in
the case of La Barbera v. Batsch, where the original action was dismissed because of
the statute of limitations, and where the dismissal was dearly erroneous because the
statute applied was superceded retroactively by a more expansive statute, a different
result suggests itself. While such a dismissal based on the statute of limitations may
be characterized as "on the merits" for historical or policy reasons, id. at 114-15, 227
N.E.2d at 62-63, the fact remains that such a dismissal erroneously cuts off the plantiffs
substantive rights without a hearing of the merits of his claim. This is violative of the
express objective of the proposed savings statute as set forth in the rule of construc-
tion. Furthermore, the proposed statute does not require the plaintiff to appeal from
a dismissal not on the merits before resorting to recommencement. These two points
suggest that the policy of the proposal would best be served by treating dismissals
based on erroneous interpretations of the statute of limitations as "not on the merits"
and by allowing plaintiff to recommence without regard to the res judicata effect of




corporation in receivership is omitted since it seems to be inappro-
priately placed in the savings statute.93 Whether or not plaintiff
can proceed within the savings statute against successors of the
original defendant, such as personal representatives or receivers,
should depend entirely upon appropriate "survival" statutes. Being
a matter involving different policy considerations it has no place in
a statute designed to extend the limitations period in order to
avoid unfair loss of substantive rights.
B. Special Provisions
1. Personal Jurisdiction
As suggested above, all of the provisions relating to jurisdic-
tion should be marshaled together into chapter 2702 of the Omo
R-EviSED CODES. The following specific provisions are recommended:
2702.01. Definitions.
As used in sections 2702.01 to 2702, inclusive, of the Re-
vised Code, "person" includes an individual, his executor, ad-
ministrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation,
partnership, association or any other legal or commercial en-
tity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliar
, 
of this state and
whether or not organized under the laws of this State.
This section is essentially the same as current Orno REv.
CODE section 2307.381, except that the italicized language has been
changed to reflect the reorganization of the statute and the fact that
the chapter on jurisdiction will apply to non-residents as well as
residents. It carries precisely the same meaning as section 1.01 of
the Uniform Interstate & International Procedure Act from which
section 2307.381 was adopted.94
In rare cases this provision could permit a suit to be recommenced several years
after the original action was brought. for example, a party could appeal a decision on
jurisdiction under a long-arm statute all the way to the United States Supreme Court.
If the Supreme Court ruled that there was no jurisdicion, the plaintiff would have one
additional year within which to recommence his action. It is suggested, however, that
the potential hardship to defendant, who, after all, had notice of the action before
the limitations period expired, is outweighed by the potential hardship to a plaintiff
who has already invested a great deal in litigation expenses if his claim is then barred.
If the proposals in this paper are adopted, the problem should almost never arise in
actions originally commenced in Ohio. In any event, similar delay is possible under
the current statute.
" Perhaps that language should be re-enacted in chap. 17.
" See PROCEEDINGS 220 (1962).
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2702.02. General Personal Jurisdiction.05
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person
as to any cause of action if such person is
(1) domiciled in the State,
(2) other than a natural person and organized under the
laws of the State,
(3) systematically and continuously carrying on substantial
business within the State,
(4) personally present within the state, or
(5) if such person consents to the jurisdiction of the court,
to the extent authorized by the consent.
This section purports to include all of the constitutionally
permissible bases of exercising unlimited general jurisdiction.0"
It contains no ground of jurisdiction which is not already well
known and well accepted throughout the United States. By adding
this provision, however, the need to have separate provisions for
general personal jurisdiction in other sections of the Ouio REv.
CoDE is entirely obviated, and unnecessary confusion is eliminated.
Under this section the court has jurisdiction over the person
sufficient to adjudicate any cause of action, whether or not it has
any connection with defendant's activities in Ohio. 7 This "general"
jurisdiction, of course, does not constitute an expansion of the right
to sue a defendant in unrelated actions beyond that generally per-
mitted now, although, in effect, it does bring the definition of what
will constitute "doing business" for purpose of suit against a foreign
corporation on a non-forum related cause of action into line with
what is constitutionally permitted by the International Shoe case.0 8
The only exception to general jurisdiction over unrelated causes in
this section is contained in subsection (5), where it is possible for
defendant to limit his consent to be sued, as in an agreement be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, to specific matters. The effect of a
general appearance, however, will remain unchanged. In its major
effect, therefore, this section will merely codify, consolidate and
clarify existing common law rules which might otherwise be diffi-
cult to understand or to locate. Not only is it in agreement with
the uniform laws, but it is similar to provisions already adopted in
"' This proposal was adapted from the UNIFORM INTIRSTATH & INTERNAVIONAL
PROCEDURE ACT § 1.02 and the MIcH. REv. JuDIc. AcT of 1962, chap. 7.
See Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 HAR. L. REV. 1121, 1136-44 (1966).
" Id.
" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
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other States which have attempted to clean up their statutory rules
in this area.99
2702.03 Limited Personal Jurisdiction. 1°°
(A) If permitted by the Constitution of the United States
and of this State, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of ac-
tion arising from the person's:
(1) Transacting any business in this State;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this State;(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this
state;(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omis-
sion outside this State if he regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered in this State;(5) Causing injury in this State to any person by breach
of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale
of goods outside this State when he might reasonably
have expected such person to use, consume, or be af-
fected by the goods in this State, provided that he also
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services ren-
dered in this State;(6) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real prop-
erty in this State;(7) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this State at the time of contracting;
(8) Acting as a director, manager, trustee, or other officer
of any corporation incorporated under the laws of, or
having its principal place of business within this State;
(9) Conducting activity or having an interest in, using,
or possessing real or personal property within the State
which is subject to tax or other assessment by this State
or any subdivision thereof, in an action to recover such
tax or assessment.
(B) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon
this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumer-
ated in this section may be asserted against him.
The only changes to current Orno RviSED CODE section
2307.382 are the additions noted by italics. The purpose of the first
change, a reference to possible constitutional limitations on the exer-
" Compare, for example, MIcE. REV. JurIc. Acr of 1961, §§ 600.701, 600.711,
600.721, and 600.731.
See generally Commen, Jurisdiction Under New Ohio "Long-Arm" Statute -
Problems of Interpretation and Application, 35 U. ON. L. REV. 157 (1966).
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cise of jurisdiction, is designed to reflect the fact that such limitations
may exist, that by virtue of the uncertainty as to the precise bounda-
ries of the due process clause the statute may be unconstitutional as
applied to some situations which clearly fall within the statutory
language and to serve as a caveat to the attorney who might not be
familiar with International Shoe and its progeny. By including such
a caveat plaintiff's attorney may be alerted to the advisability of
avoiding a doubtful use of this statute which might lead to lengthy
proceedings culminating finally in a dismissal, and of commencing
suit in a court that clearly has jurisdiction on more conventional
grounds.
The second addition, sub-paragraph (8), is designed to facilitate
derivative stockholders suits wherein non-resident officers of the
domestic corporation might have to be joined as parties defend-
ant. 1' 1 The Commissioners of Uniform State Laws suggest that such
provision be included in the statutes dealing with corporations, 102
but the philosophy of the revision proposed here is to consolidate
all jurisdictional provisions into one chapter of the OHIO REv.
CoDE for ease of reference.
The third addition, sub-paragraph (9), might constitute a use-
ful and significant addition to the jurisdiction of Ohio courts over
non-residents. It will be recalled that International Shoe v. Wash-
ington 03 was itself a suit by the State of Washington brought in
Washington to recover an unemployment compensation assessment
against a Missouri corporation. Based on the rationale of Interna-
tional Shoe it would seem to follow that obtaining personal juris-
diction in Ohio over a non-resident who has left the State in order
to recover taxes incurred while defendant was conducting taxable
activities within the State should not offend the Supreme Court's
notion of "fair play and substantial justice." Whether and to what
extent such a provision will make it easier for Ohio taxing authori-
ties to collect such taxes' 04 or prove a boom to Ohio's coffers are
2*1 See MrcH. REv. Jurnc AcT of 1961, MicI. COMPILED LAWs ANN. §
600.705 (6).
102 See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 33, at 224.
102 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
' Existing provisions of the Ohio "long-arm" statute probably establish iurlsdlc.
tdon to adjudicate tax claims over non-residents in most of the situations which might
arise. However, the proposed special section is designed to consolidate such jurisdlc.
tion into one section, to cover all situations in which Jurisdiction is constitutionally
permissible, and to alert Ohio tax collectors to the possibilities presented by bringing
suit against nonresident taxpayers in local Ohio courts. Cf, Op. ATl'y. G3N. OF OHio
349 (1963); Ohio v. Kleitch Bros., 357 Mich. 504, 98 N.W.2d 636 (1959).
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matters which cannot be predicted. The possibilities, however, are
clearly present, since the ease of securing a judgment will be much
enhanced.
2702.04. Other bases of jurisdiction unaffected.
A court of this State may exercise jurisdiction on any other
basis authorized by law. Where sections of the code other than
sections 2702.01 to 2702.04 provide additional bases of jurisdic-
tion over persons, property or status, such sections shall not be
deemed exclusive unless expressly so provided therein.
While it is one of the purposes of this revision to consolidate
all statutory provisions relating to jurisdiction of the person, other
means of obtaining jurisdiction in rem or quasi-in-rem are left un-
touched.'0 5 Furthermore, even if all scattered provisions for in
personam jurisdiction are repealed, as recommended, there is no
guarantee that isolated provisions might not be passed in the fu-
ture. This revision of OHIO REv. CODE section 2307.385, there-
fore, is designed to leave other bases of jurisdiction permitted by law
intact. The language of the first sentence is exactly the same as
that recommended by the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws,1 6
which was altered when the long-arm statute was first passed in Ohio.
The second sentence, entirely new, is designed to insure that more
limited provisions for securing jurisdiction which might find their
way into the statutes will not ensnare the unwary. 0 7 They will not
be deemed the exclusive method unless the legislature so provides
by express language. Thus, if such statutes are present the attorney
will not ordinarily be precluded from using these general jurisdic-
tional statutes to secure personal jurisdiction.
2702.05 Jurisdiction lacking or doubtful.
When the court finds that exercise of jurisdiction over de-
fendant would be improper under the foregoing provisions the
court shall (1) dismiss the action but, (2) if it should appear
that the failure of jurisdiction is caused by doubtful adequacy
In an interview with the Chief of the Income Tax Division of the City of Colum-
bus, Mr. Raymond Posgay, my research assistant for this artide, learned that the problem
of collecting income taxes from non-residents who have left the dty is not a serious
one. The general categories are three: university students, federal employees and trans-
ients moving from job to job. About half of the cases involve amounts that are not
worth going to court for. The total annual loss to the city is about $8,000-410,000.
Nonetheless, the director agreed that jurisdiction to sue non-residents in local courts
might ease his collection problem.
See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 2715 (Page 1953).
2" UNIFORM INTERSTATE & hNENATONAL PROCEDURE Acr § 2.05.
Cf. Hayslip v. Conrad Produce, Inc., 10 Ohio Misc. 155, 226 N.E.2d 839
(C.P. 1967).
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of contacts between defendant and this State or by inconveni-
ence to defendant if the action be prosecuted in this State, the
court upon plaintiff's request shall retain the action for trial
unless defendant consents to the jurisdiction of the court, waives
any objections to venue and waives the defense of the statute of
limitations as to the action in that forum which the court deems
to be the most convenient forum outside this State. In such case
the court shall not dismiss the action, which shall be stayed,
until the court receives notice by affidavit that plaintiff has
recommenced the action in the convenient forum and defendant
has there submitted to the jurisdiction and waived objection
to venue and the applicable statute of limitations, or that plain-
tiff has not recommenced the action in the convenient forum
within 60 days after the order staying the original action.
The failure of defendant in such case to agree to the recom-
mencement of suit in the designated convenient forum or to ful-
fill the conditions, aforesaid, shall constitute a waiver of any
objection to the jurisdiction of the court over defendant's per-
son.
In staying the proceeding pending recommencement in an-
other forum, the court may award to the defendant such actual
costs, including attorney's fees, as the court deems reasonable
and just to compensate the defendant for such inconvenience
and expense as he may have been caused by the commencing
of suit in an inconvenient forum.
Section (2) of this section shall be inapplicable to a de.
fendant who has failed to appear specially or otherwise.
This section is entirely new.108 It is intended to deal with a
situation in which defendant's contacts with the State of Ohio are
too insignificant to sustain the jurisdiction of Ohio courts over the
defendant's person as to plaintiff's cause of action. If defendant has
no contacts with the State, and if no other bases of jurisdiction are
present, the court shall dismiss the action. The same result would
also be required where defendant's contacts with the State are
clearly inadequate to sustain jurisdiction. Such would be the case,
for example, where plaintiff seeks to acquire jurisdiction over a
non-resident corporation having no contacts with the State by serv-
ing process personally upon a non-resident officer who happened to
be visiting friends in the State.100 In these situations the plaintiff
would seem to have no colorable basis for asserting jurisdiction,
and it would tend to work injustice and permit harassment if juris-
diction were created deus ex machina. But, where defendant's con-
' The general idea, however, is not new. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.19
(1967 Supp.) and Ehrenzweig at 313.
1' See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915);
R.STATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 31 (1942).
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tacts with the State are of doubtful adequacy-for example, where
they seem to fall within the language of the "long-arm" statute
but may nevertheless fail to pass constitutional muster under the
decisions, as where it is not clear that defendant is "purposefully
availing" himself of the privilege of conducting activity within the
State,110 then it does not seem unreasonable to require him to
choose whether to assent to transfer to a convenient forum outside
the State or to proceed with the trial in Ohio. At least it would not
seem unfair if defendant had already appeared specially to contest
jurisdiction and was permitted to exercise his option. There would
seem to be little question as to the constitutionality of providing
such an option since, in York v. Texas,11' the Supreme Court up-
held general jurisdiction, without reference to defendant's con-
tacts with the State and without regard to defendant's inconve-
nience, where he merely appeared specially to attack jurisdiction.
A fortiori, there should be even less doubt under the proposed
statute where defendant has the option of permitting transfer to a
convenient forum.
The option provision will not apply, however, where de-
fendant enters no appearance. Then perhaps the court should de-
cide whether the defendant's contacts are sufficient-difficult as
that decision may be under the confusing authorities-and dismiss
on his own motion or enter a default judgment for plaintiff. In
the latter event the plaintiff may discover, when defendant col-
laterally attacks the judgment, that there was in fact no jurisdic-
tion; but he may be saved by the savings statute' 12 if he can then
acquire jurisdiction in Ohio. Even if he cannot our sympathies
need not run too strongly in his favor, for we can assume that if
defendant had actual notice and failed to appear, the plaintiff should
have been forewarned that jurisdiction was doubtful-especially if
the matters in litigation were of any substance-and should have
acted to commence suit in a place where jurisdictional doubts were
not present.
It should be noted that the transfer option only applies if
plaintiff so requests. In the usual case defendant will enter a plea
or motion which raises the jurisdictional question and plaintiff
will then have to request the transfer before the court dismisses.
If plaintiff is unwilling to have the case transferred to a more con-
=0 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235 (1958).
u 137U.S. 15 (1890).
n OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1953).
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venient forum, then he will have to risk the possibility that the
court will dismiss and the dismissal will be affirmed on appeal. If
it is so affirmed, and if the only proper place to acquire juris-
diction is another State where no savings statute exists and which
does not recognize the Ohio savings statute, then plaintiff may find
himself absolutely barred by the other State's statute of limitations.
Again, our sympathies are not likely to run in favor of such a plain-
tiff since adequate opportunity was provided to commence the suit
in a more convenient forum.
The proposal also includes a section designed to compensate
the defendant for the hardship and inconvenience of having to
attack jurisdiction in an improper forum. If the transfer is ordered
the judge may award reasonable costs, including attorney's fees, to
the defendant to compensate him for his inconvenience. The de-
termination of whether to award costs and what is a reasonable
amount will be left to sound judicial discretion, but such questions
as whether plaintiff acted in good or bad faith in bringing the
action in Ohio, or whether plaintiff should have been aware of
the doubtful adequacy of the contacts in this State, ought to be
relevant.118
Lastly, this proposal deals with situations where jurisdiction
is lacking or in serious doubt. While jurisdiction may turn out to
be affirmed in doubtful cases, the major purpose of section (2) of
this proposal is to encourage the plaintiff and defendant to permit
transfei of the suit to a forum where such doubts will not exist
and where, by definition, convenience and fairness will more clearly
be served. This section may overlap, but it does not generally
cover a subsequent proposal in the venue section,11" 4 which will
allow transfer to a more convenient forum within or without the
State even where jurisdiction over defendant's person is clearly
proper in the forum in which suit is originally brought. Such a
statute, though somewhat similar in objectives to the instant pro-
posal, is more appropriately placed in the venue section.
2. Venue
2704.01 Venue not Jurisdictional.
The provisions of this chapter relate to venue and are not
jurisdictional. No order, judgment, or decree shall be void or
voidable solely on the ground that there was improper venue.
Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.20 (1967 Supp.).
See text infra p. 149.
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Section 2704.01115 is designed to set to rest the problems raised
by Professor Wills in his 1950 article on Ohio jurisdiction and
venue:16 : the only remedies for improper venue, which is merely a
matter of convenience of location, will be those set forth specifically
in this chapter. Thus, for example, if a case should be litigated in
an inconvenient county within the state, and if the parties or the
court should not seek to have the case transferred to a more con-
venient county, or if the court, in its discretion, refuses to transfer
upon the request of one of the parties, a judgment rendered in the
action will be valid and enforceable. Even if the court should
abuse its discretion in refusing to transfer upon timely request, the
judgment will only be subject to direct attack-by appeal-on this
ground, and not to collateral attack when the judgment is sought
to be enforced. In other words, in no event will a venue problem
be treated as if it affected the subject matter jurisdiction or the
personal jurisdiction of the court.
This clean separation of venue from jurisdiction is in accord-
ance with enlightened practice followed in other States and in the
federal system."17 It should remove a troublesome situation which
has existed in Ohio jurisprudence for many years.
2704.02.118 Venue. Where proper.
Where practicable, every action shall be commenced and
tried in a forum convenient to the parties and witnesses, wherejustice can be admiiiistered without prejudice or delay.
2704.03 Counties deemed convenient.
In any action, any one or more of the following counties
shall be presumed to be convenient forums for the purpose of
establishing proper venue under section 2704.02.
(a) The county where the defendant resides;
(b) The county where the defendant has his principal
place of business;
(c) A county where the defendant conducted activity which
gave rise to the cause of action;
(d) A county where defendant regularly and systematically
conducts his business activity or, if a public officer,
Adapted from 28 US.C § 1406(b) (1964) and Mich. Rev. Judic. Act. of 1961,
MscH. Co.mpn mD LAws ANN. § 600.1601 (1968).
' See Wills, The Effect of Improper Venue Upon Jurisdiction of the Person and
Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter, 11 OHIo ST. L. J. 291 (1950).
" Supra note 115.
The proposed venue statutes, OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2704.02-.13, wil first be
presented in consecutive order without comment. Commentary and citations will follow
infra at pp. 152-63.
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where he performs his duties or holds office within the
State;
(e) If the subject of the action is real or tangible personal
property, a county wherein the property, or any part
thereof, is situated;
(f) The county in which all or a part of the cause of ac-
tion arose; or, if the cause of action arose upon a river,
or other watercourse, or a road, which is the boundary
of the State, or of two or more counties, in any county
bordering on such river, watercourse, or road, and op-
posite to the place where the cause of action arose;
(g) In an action against an executor, administrator, guard.
ian, or trustee, in the county wherein he was appointed;
(h) In actions for divorce, annulment or for alimony in
the county in which the plaintiff is and has been a resi-
dent for at least ninety days immediately preceding
the filing of the petition;
(i) If there is no other available forum in paragraphs (a)
through (h), in the county where plaintiff resides,
has his principal place of business, regularly and sys-
tematically conducts business activity or, in a case
where personal injuries suffered by plaintiff are at is-
sue, in a county in which plaintiff received extensive
medical treatment or was hospitalized incident to his
cause of action;
(j) If there is no other available forum in paragraphs (a)
through (i) or in other sections of the Revised Code,
(1) in the county in which defendant has property or
debts owing to him subject to attachment or gar-
nishment,
(2) in the county in which defendant has appointed
an agent to receive service of process or wherein
such agent has been appointed by operation of
law, or
(3) in the county in which defendant is summoned.
2704.04 Actions commenced in other counties.
Upon timely motion of any party in an action commenced
in a county other than one enumerated in section 2704.03, or
upon its own motion, the court shall transfer the action to a
county presumed to be convenient under section 2704.03 unless
plaintiff establishes that the original forum in which the action
was commenced is itself a more convenient county than those
enumerated in section 2704.03.
2704.05 Change of venue to county within the State.
Upon motion of any party or upon its own motion the
court may transfer any civil action to any other convenient
forum within the State
(a) When it appears that a fair and impartial trial can-
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I not be had in the county where the suit is pending; or
(b) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice without prejudice or delay.
2704.06 No convenient forum within this State.
In any action brought in a court of this State, if the court,
upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, determines:
(a) that the county in which the action is brought is not
a convenient forum;
(b) that there is no other convenient place for trial with-
in this State; and
(c) that there exists a convenient place for trial in an-
other jurisdiction outside this State,
the court shall stay the action upon the conditions that defend-
ant consents to jurisdiction and waives venue and the applica-
tion of the statute of limitations to the action in that forum in
another jurisdiction which the court deems to be the most con-
venient forum. If defendant agrees to the conditions the court
shall not dismiss the action, but it shall be stayed, until the
court receives notice by affidavit that plaintiff has recommenced
the action in the convenient forum and defendant has com-
plied with the conditions aforesaid, or that plaintiff has not
recommenced the action in the convenient forum -within 60
days after the effective date of the order staying the original
action. If the defendant does not agree to or comply with the
conditions aforesaid the court shall hear the action.
If the court determines that there does not exist a con-
venient forum in another jurisdiction, it may hear the action
or dismiss, as the interests of justice require.
2704.07 Determining convenience.
For purposes of Revised Code sections 2704.02 through
2704.06 and 2704.08, in determining whether and to what ex-
tent a forum is convenient and whether a transfer would be
in the interest of justice without prejudice or delay, a court
may consider, among others, the following factors:
(a) The ease of access to sources of proof of liability,
damages and defenses in the forum and in other
forums;
(b) The availability of compulsory process for the attend-
ance of unilling witnesses in the forum and in other
forums;
(c) The availability of procedures for pre-trial discovery
and depositions and the admissibility of depositions
as evidence in the forum and in other forums;
(d) The cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses and
other evidence in the forum and in other forums;
(e) The possibility of a view of the premises, if a view
would be appropriate to the action, in the forum and
in other forums;
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(f) Relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial in the
forum and in other forums;
(g) Relative expense to plaintiff and to defendant of prose-
cuting or defending the action in the forum and in
other forums;
(h) The motives of the plaintiff in bringing the action in
the forum rather than in other available forums, and
the motives of the defendant in seeking a transfer to
another forum;
(i) The delay, if any, in bringing the action to trial in
the forum and in other forums;
(j) In the case of jury trial, the relationship between the
controversy and the community from which the jury
may be drawn in the forum and in other forums;
(k) The extent to which the law applicable to the case is
governed by the law of the forum and other jurisdic-
tions; and
(1) The proximity of other forums to the forum.
In a suit brought in a county to which a presumption of
convenience is applied under section 2704.02 of the Revised
Code, the court shall give presumptive weight to the county
in which suit is brought, but the court may determine that such
county is not a convenient forum if,, on balance, the relevant
factors, such as those enumerated herein, preponderate heavily
against such county and in favor of another forum.
2704.08 Multiple defendants and multiple causes of action.
In any action brought by one or more plaintiffs against one
or more defendants involving one or more causes of action, the
forum shall be-deemed a convenient forum, and venue therein
shall be proper, if the venue is proper as to any one party other
than a nominal party, or as to any one cause of action. But the
court, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, may
order a severance and transfer of any claim, cross-claim, counter-
claim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims,
or issues, involving one or more plaintiffs and one or more de-
fendants, to a more convenient forum or forums, for the con-
venience of parties and witnesses in the interest of justice, pur-
suant to section 2704.07 of the Revised Code.
Neither the dismissal of any claim nor the dropping of any
party except an indispensable party shall affect the jurisdiction
of the court over the remaining claims or remaining parties.
2704.09 Costs.
In any action which is transferred, stayed, dismissed or re-
tained for trial pursuant to' Revised Code 2704.01 through
2704.08, the court in which the action was initially brought
may 'award such actual costs, including attorney's fees, as the
court deems reasonable and just:
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(a) to compensate a party for such inconvenience, ex-
pense and delay as he may have been caused by the
commencement of suit in an inconvenient forum, or
(b) to compensate a party for such inconvenience, expense
and delay as he may have been caused by the bringing
of a frivolous motion to dismiss or transfer under this
chapter.
2704.10 Jurisdiction of transferee court; allocation of expenses;
retransfer.
The court of the county within this State to which a trans-
fer is made under any provision of this chapter shall thereupon
have full jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and the
parties to the action. All court costs and charges of the action
or part thereof transferred which are not paid by the parties
prior to the transfer shall be charged and collected by the court
to which the action is transferred. The court of a transferee
county shall not re-transfer an action transferred to it to the
transferor or any other court unless it finds that the transfer
constituted an abuse of discretion by the transferor court. If the
action is re-transferred to the transferor court, and if another
judge is available, it shall be assigned for trial to a judge other
than the judge who ordered the original transfer.
2704.11 Transfer of judgments in actions affecting real or tan-
gible personal property.
When a civil action affecting the title to or possession of
real or tangible personal property has been tried in a county
other than the county in which all of the real or tangible per-
sonal property is situated, the clerk of the court, after finaljudgment therein, must certify under his seal of office and trans-
mit a copy of the judgment to the corresponding court of any
county in which real or tangible personal property affected by
the action is situated. The clerk of the court receiving the copy
must file and record the judgment in the records of the court,
designating it as a judgment transferred from ............................
........................................ (naming the court).
2704.12 Discretion of Judge.
The decision of a court transferring, dismissing, staying or
refusing to transfer, dismiss or stay an action or part thereof
under Revised Code 2704.01-2704.12 or awarding costs under
section 2704.09, shall be within the sound discretion of the trial
judge, and shall not be reversed except for abuse of such
discretion.
2704.13 Other venue statutes.
Where sections of the Revised Code other than § 2704.01
to 2704.12 provide for venue in specific civil actions, the places
there set forth shall be presumed to be convenient forums as
under section 2704.03 hereof, but shall not be deemed the exclu-
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sive place of venue unless the applicable section expressly so
provides.
(a) The General Pattern
Despite the apparent complexity of these proposed statutes the
intended pattern is fairly simple and straight-forward. The basic
objective is to have every lawsuit tried in a convenient forum. But,
because it is not always possible to determine in advance which
county or counties will prove convenient for the trial of a particular
lawsuit or even for a particular class of lawsuits, 10 the traditional
venue statute-which has attempted to make that determination by
legislative fiat-has been scrapped in favor of a more flexible ap-
proach. Nonetheless, the useful features and some of the prefer-
ences of the traditional approach-such as holding most trials in a
forum convenient to defendant1 20 or allowing suit in a real action
to proceed in a county where the land is located' 21-are included,
although not necessarily made mandatory.
A secondary objective incorporated in the proposal is to relieve
calendar congestion and delay by allowing a judge to take the condi-
tion of the dockets in his county and other counties into considera-
tion in determining whether to transfer a case.12 2 The mere fact
that there is calendar congestion and delay in his county and little
or none in another county ought not alone to constitute a sufficient
basis for ordering transfer, but in connection with other factors it
could be considered a significant make-weight.' 2 8
(b) Basic Framework of Chapter 2704
First, if plaintiff brings suit in a county enumerated in
2704.03.124 or in a place designated in another venue statute, 12
venue will be deemed proper and the case will be presumed to have
been brought in a convenient forum. In the vast majority of cases
the action will proceed to trial in that county.
It should be noted here that while section 2704.03 expands the
number of counties in which venue will be deemed proper and
presumed convenient as compared with current law, it does set up
a See text supra p. 132.
Proposed §§ 2704.03 (a) - (d), supra p. 147 See Stevens, Venue Statute: Diagnosh
and Proposed Cure, 49 MicH. L. REv. 307, 311-13 (1951).
Proposed § 2704.03(e), supra p. 148. See Stevens, supra note 120, at 310.
Proposed § 2704.07(i), supra p. 150.
Proposed § 2407.01, last paragraph, supra p. 150.
... Supra pp. 147-48.
' Proposed § 2704.13, supra p. 151.
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a system of priorities. For example, a plaintiff in a tort action who
wishes to commence suit in the county in which he resides will not
get the benefit of the presumption unless defendant does not re-
side or have his principal place of business within the state, has not
conducted activity within the state which gave rise to the cause
of action, does not regularly and systematically conduct his business
activity within the state and unless the cause of action or part of it
did not arise within the state.126 In short, as is generally true of
most venue statutes, this proposal favors the bringing of suit in
counties with which defendant has had meaningful contact or in
counties which have a meaningful relation to the cause of action.
However, the plaintiff is not necessarily locked in to such counties
if in a particular case another county is more convenient.
Second, if the defendant has reason to believe that the county
in which the action is brought, although presumed to be a conve-
nient forum under 2704.03, is not a convenient forum, and the de-
fendant moves to transfer, the court is obliged to consider the factors
enumerated in Section 2704.07127 in order to determine whether
the presumption of convenience is overcome and whether the case
should therefore be transferred, under section 2704.05,128, to a more
convenient forum within the state.
Third, if the plaintiff brings suit in a county other than one
deemed proper under section 2704.03, then upon defendant's mo-
tion the court is obliged under section 2704.04, to transfer to a con-
venient forum (not necessarily one enumerated in section 2704.03)
unless the plaintiff establishes that the county in which he brought
suit is a more convenient forum when the factors enumerated in
section 2704.07 are considered.12 9 That is, the fact that plaintiff has
brought suit in a county which is not listed as a proper venue will
not result in a dismissal, but the action will either be retained for
trial or be transferred to a more convenient forum.
Fourth, whether plaintiff brings his action in a presumptively
convenient forum or not it is open to the court, on its own motion
or on motion of defendant, to find that the county in which the
suit is brought is an inconvenient forum, and that there exists no
convenient forum within the state to which the case could be trans-
' Proposed § 2704.03 (i), supra p. 148.
' Supra pp. 149-50.
' Suora pp. 148-49. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Burnett v. New York CeC RIL,
380 U.S. 414, 131 n.8 (1965) listed thirty-one states vhich have tansfer-of-venue
statutes.
' Supra p. 148.
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ferred.18 0 This might occur, for example, in a situation where a non.
resident plaintiff and a nonresident defendant were litigating a
wholly out-of-state cause of action in an Ohio county where the
defendant happened fortuitously to be found and served with pro-
cess. Here, the county would be presumed convenient under 2704.08,
paragraph j (3).131 Nevertheless, the court would be likely to find
that there is no reason, apart from the fact that plaintiff and de-
fendant are before the court, for litigating the case in the county
in which it was brought, or anywhere else within the State.
In this situation two possibilities are presented under section
2704.06. First, the court can stay the action while plaintiff brings
suit in a convenient forum in another jurisdiction outside the State.
As a condition to ordering the stay the court can extract the de-
fendant's consent to jurisdiction of his person, and his waiver of
objections to venue and the statute of limitations in the other State.
In effect, this procedure would amount to a transfer to another
State, with the troublesome condition in the federal transfer statutes
-that the action be transferred to a place "where it might have been
brought" 32-eliminated. If defendant should fail to consent or
should breach his agreement to consent then the court is free to
proceed with the action, even though the forum is inconvenient.
The second possibility-highly remote unless the cause of action
occurred outside the United States and the parties were aliens-is
that there is no other forum moie convenient than the one in which
the suit has been brought. In this situation the court has discretion
either to dismiss or proceed. Ordinarily, the court could be expected
to make this decision by balancing the harm to the plaintiff of a
dismissal against the harm to the defendant in proceeding in a
totally strange forum fortuitously selected and the effect on the ad-
ministration of justice if an "alien" cause of action is heard in the
forum. In most cases justice would probably require the court to
hear the action; this would be consistent with current Ohio prac-
tice, which does not recognize the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.1 83 Nevertheless, the right to dismiss and thereby to prevent
Proposed § 2704.06, .rupra p. 149.
131 Supra p. 148.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1964). Section 1406(a) provides that the
transfer shall be to a district or division in which the action could have been brought. See
L MOORE & H. FIrNK, JUDIcIAL CODE PAMPHLET 605-10, 619 (1966).
"= Mattone v. Argentina, 123 Ohio St. 393, 175 N.E. 603 (1931).
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an unwarranted imposition on the court's jurisdiction or serious
injustice to defendant ought to be available.184
Fifth, if there are multiple plaintiffs, defendants or causes of
action venue will be deemed proper if the county of suit is con-
venient under the terms of section 2704.03 as to any party or as to
the place where one of the causes of action arose.135 Section 2704.08
is not intended to change the rules permitting or denying joinder
of parties or causes of action. The section, somewhat similar in word-
ing to rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will
permit the court to sever claims or issues and transfer them to a
more convenient forum for trial under the same circumstances in
which a transfer of any action will be allowed under this chapter.
Importantly, this section provides that if venue is based upon a re-
lationship between the activities of one defendant or one plaintiff
and the forum, or upon the fact that one of several causes of action
arose in the county, and the "key" party is dropped or the "key"
cause of action is dismissed, the court will not lose jurisdiction over
the remaining parties or causes.13 6 Instead, the court can proceed
with the case or transfer to a more convenient forum.
Sixth, again, as in the section dealing with personal jurisdic-
tion, the court has power, under section 2704.09,137 to award costs
to either plaintiff or defendant, including reasonable attorney's fees,
to compensate defendant for the inconvenience of being sued in an
inconvenient forum and to compensate plaintiff for being forced to
defend a frivolous motion to transfer or dismiss. Properly used this
section should discourage abuse of plaintiff's privilege of bringing
his action in a county other than one enumerated in section 2704.03,
and should also prevent the motion to transfer under this chapter
from becoming a tool whereby the defendant can harass the plaintiff
- Cf. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo.Ameficv Lew,
29 COLuM. L RBr. 1 (1929). The court should not dismiss if there is no other forum
in which suit could have been brought.
Proposed § 2704.08, supra p. 150.
This would overturn the draconian rule of Bucurenitt v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St.
546, 195 NY_ 565 (1927), which provides that where two or more defendants residing
in different counties are sued in a tort action and the validity of service on D2 (under
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2703.04 (Page 1953)) is based upon the action being
"rightly brought" in a proper county against D1, the court will lose jurisdiction of the
action against D2 if a verdict is returned in favor of D1. See also Glass v. McCullough
Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 112 NX.2d 823 (1953); Dunn v. HaIet, 4 Ohio
St. 436 (1854). Compare Maloney v. Callahan, 127 Ohio St. 387, 188 N... 656
(1933).
' Supra pp. 150-51.
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and delay the litigation. 138 Thus, the language of section 2704.09
permits the court to award such reasonable costs as are "just." This
should be interpreted to allow the court to consider the motives and
good faith of the parties in deciding what amount is just. For exam-
ple, the bringing of suit by plaintiff in an inconvenient forum ought
not to be the basis of an award of all of the defendant's attorney's
fees attributable to the motion to transfer where plaintiff had no
other reasonable alternative or, particularly, where plaintiff's in-
ability to bring suit in a convenient forum was due to defendant's
own evasive tactics.
Seventh, another provision designed to prevent harassment and
delay is section 2704.12,139 which spells out that orders issued under
the main provisions of this chapter shall, in effect, be final and not
subject to reversal on appeal except in cases of abuse of discretion.
In most cases, the questions whether to transfer or whether to
award all or part of the costs of transfer will be based on a large num-
ber of variables.140 While the court ought not to transfer a cause
out of a presumptively convenient forum, or award heavy costs,
unless there is a strong reason to do so, 141 it is apparent that in
many cases reasonable men might differ as to the proper decision.
In such cases reexamination of the decision, if allowed, would en-
courage delay and harassment. However, the danger of abuse of
these powers is present and, for the protection of the parties, it is
necessary to retain the right to appeal on the ground of abuse of
discretion.
(c.) Special Problems and Applications
Section 2704.03, which creates a presumption of convenience if
suit is brought in an enumerated county, is consistent with some
common-sense views of which geographical areas will normally prove
convenient for the trial of a law suit. It may be assumed that de-
fendant will ordinarily have little to complain about if suit is com-
menced in a county in which he resides or in which he habitually
conducts activity. It is intended, therefore, that these counties will
be presumed to be convenient in any lawsuit, even in those actions
which in the past were confined to other counties. Similarly, the
county in which defendant conducted activity giving rise to the
12 Cf. FoSTER, REVISION NoTEs TO Wis. STAT. ANN. Title XXV § 262.20, at 65,
" Supra p. 151.
2,0 See Proposed § 2704.07, sapra pp. 149-50, and cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947).




cause of action might ordinarily be deemed a convenient forum,
although more instances can be imagined where trial in such a
county might prove inconvenient. It is intended that the language
"conducted activity which gave rise to the cause of action" and "in
which.., a part of the cause of action arose" should be liberally in-
terpreted to include any activity closely associated with the cause of
action even though it might technically be argued that the cause of
action did not arise in that county.142 For example, defendant in an
action for personal injuries might be sued in a county where he
negligently repaired plaintiff's automobile although the injury re-
sulting from such negligent repair actually occurred in another
county. Or defendant might be sued in a county where he wrote a
libelous letter although the libelous words were published in an-
other county. Since this section only creates a rebuttable presump-
tion of convenience, narrow or niggardly interpretation of its
language would serve no useful purpose.
Another alternative, contained in paragraph (e) ,143 is the coun-
ty where all or part of the property is located in an action in which
real or tangible personal property is the subject of the action. It
should be emphasized that this county is not exclusive, since other
counties may also be deemed convenient under this section. Thus,
actions for trespass, ejectment, specific performance, mortgage fore-
closure, to remove cloud on title and partition may be brought in
other counties, although it is expected that many such suits will
continue to be brought in the county where the land is located.144
However, there does not seem to be any special reason why the
trial of any of these actions, as opposed to execution of judgment,
must be brought in the county in which the property is located
rather than some other convenient county. If the action is brought
in a different county, and if a judgment or decree is rendered, then
4 Compare the recommendations of Professor Stevens in Stevens, Venue Statutes:
Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 Mic-. L. REv. 307, 333-34 (1951).
142 Supra p. 148.
1" Frequently, the court of the county in which the res is located will be in the
best position to deal with the problems raised by the action. Stevens, supra note 142
at 310. In particular cases, however, other counties may prove to be more convenient.
E.g., an action for specific performance where no view of the premises is required and
the witnesses to the contract and its alleged breach are located elsewhere.
In any event, the troublesome common law distinction between personal actions
that are local and those that are transitory was not adopted in Ohio. Personal actions
are local only if made so by statute. Fostoria v. Fox, 60 Ohio St 340, 54 N.E. 370
(1899); Genin v. Grier, 10 Ohio St. 209 (1840). See, e.g., Gustafson v. Buddey,
161 Ohio St. 160, 118 N.E.2d 403 (1954).
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such judgment or decree;is required by section 2704.11 to be filed
and recorded in the county where the property is located.145
Similarly, trial of an action against a public officer will also be
deemed convenient in any one of the enumerated counties. 140 Such
an action will be permitted in, but will not be limited to, the coun-
ty where the officer performs his duties or holds office. The same
approach ii taken with respect to actions against legal representa-
tives, who can be sued in any one of the enumerated counties as
well as in the county in-which the appointment was made.1 47
Another alternative open to plaintiff is to bring suit in a county
where all or part of the cause of action arose.1 48 Ordinarily, such
county will be the place where witnesses to liability will be present
and where a view of the premises will be available.
In actions for divorce, annulment or alimony the existing place
of venue is retained 49 but it too is to coexist with other enumerated
alternatives. There seems to be no good reason why such suits should
not be brought in counties where defendant has close relationships,
providing of course that other substantive requirements, such as
residence or domicile, are fulfilled.150 A statute dealing with the
establishment of a convenient forum is hardly the place to include
such substantive requirements. It is to be expected, of course, that
such suits will ordinarily be brought in the county of plaintiff's
residence.
The remaining paragraphs of this provision- (i) through (j)151
-differ from the prior paragraphs in that the counties in (i) through
(j) will not be presumed to be convenient unless no county enu-
merated in (a) through (h) is available. Furthermore, the coun-
ties in paragraph (j) will not be entitled to the presumption unless
the counties in (a) through (i) are not available. The reason for the
difference is simply that the law has generally favored suit in places
.. Supra p. 151.
Proposed § 2704.03(d), supra pp. 147-48.
Proposed § 2704.03 (g), supra p. 148.
198 Proposed § 2704.03 (f), supra p. 148.
... Proposed § 2704.03, subsections (f), (h), supra p. 148. The equivalent pro,
vision in the current law is contained in OHIO REV. COD ANN. § 3105.03 (Page
Supp. 1966).
5 For example, the current code section which contains venue requirements for
divorce actions also requires that "plaintiff in actions for divorce and annulment shall
have been a resident of the state at least one year immediately before filing the petition."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.03 (Page Supp. 1966). This provision has nothing to
do with venue. It will not be changed by the proposed statute.
151 Supra p. 148.
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where the defendant resides or has a close connection, where the
cause of action arose or where the subject of the action is located. 52
To allow suit in a county in which plaintiff resides or has a close
connection is more likely to give the plaintiff an undue advantage
and to undermine the protection which the law has usually granted
to defendants. 153 To allow suit in a county where defendant happens
to have property unrelated to the action, where he has appointed
an agent to receive service of process, or where he has been sum-
moned, is to allow the action to proceed in a place which may be
totally unrelated to the cause of action and the parties, and which
may therefore be a most inconvenient, if not an irrational place
in which to prosecute the suit'15 4 Thus, the scheme of this proposal
is to deny these counties the benefit of the presumption unless no
other county is available. Only then will they be presumed to be
convenient because of the absence of convenient alternative forums.
Section 2704.04155 allows the court to transfer the action to a
presumptively convenient forum in a case where plaintiff brings
suit in a county to which the presumption of convenience under
section 2704.03 is not available if defendant moves for transfer or
if the court, on its own motion, decides to exercise its discretion to
transfer. In any case, plaintiff is permitted to argue that the forum
is a convenient and proper place of suit. The suit should be re-
tained there if he succeeds in convincing the court, based on the
factors set forth in section 2704.07,156 that the forum is a more con-
venient place for trial than any other county listed in section
2704.03. If it is not more convenient then it should be transferred
to an enumerated county in order to give defendant whatever ad-
vantage accrues to having the suit brought in a more traditional
forum.
If it should turn out that the non-enumerated county in which
suit is brought is more convenient than any county as to which
the presumption of convenience would have applied, but less con-
venient than another non-enumerated county, the court is still free
' See Stevens, Venue Stautes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L REV.
307, 310-12 (1951). Cf. Hayslip v. Conrad Produce, Inc., 10 Ohio Misc. 155, 226
N.R2d 839, 843-44 (C.P. 1967).
' Sunderland, The Provisions Relating to Tial Practice In the New Illinois Civil
Practice Act, 1 U. Cm. L REv. 188, 192 (1933).
,r See Stevens, supra note 152 at 313-14.
' Supra p. 148.
"u Supra pp. 149-50.
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under section 2704.0517 to transfer to the more convenient non-
enumerated county.
Section 2704.05'1 s combines the current Ohio statute, per-
mitting transfer where a fair trial cannot be had in the county in
which suit is brought, with a general transfer provision similar in
purpose to the federal transfer statute, but there are major dif-
ferences between paragraph (b) and section 1404 (a) of the fed-
eral code. First, the much criticized federal requirement that the
suit be transferred only to a place where it might have been brought
in the first place-that is, where jurisdiction, proper venue and serv-
ice could have been achieved by plaintiff without the court's as-
sistance-has been eliminated. 5 Since transfer under this provi-
sion is to another forum within the State, and since venue is now
made a matter of convenience, there is no reason why it is neces-
sary to limit the transferee forum to a place where the action "might
have been brought."' 0 Second, the criterion for transfer is changed
slightly to point up that calendar congestion and delay 01 and possi-
bilities of prejudice resulting from inconvenience are factors which
may be considered in determining whether to transfer to another
forum. The language of paragraph (b) is deliberately made general
-even ambiguous-to allow for a broad and generous interpretation
based on factors like those listed in section 2704.07. It should be
emphasized, however, that it is not the purpose of this section to
allow the shifting of cases around the state merely to solve the cal-
endar congestion problem of particular counties; the convenience
of parties and witnesses to the action should always be a more im-
portant consideration.
Section 2704.06162 is the counterpart of section 2702.05108 in
the chapter dealing with jurisdiction. Here, however, we can as-
sume that the court has acquired personal jurisdiction over the
parties. Nonetheless, the court may find that there is no convenient
forum within the State. This situation can continue to occur so long
"" Supra pp. 148-49.
"' Id.
1 See J. MOORE & H. FRSK, JUDICIAL CODE PAMPHLET 600-610 (1966).
"' Furthermore, under the approach suggested here it is arguable that an action
might have been brought in any county, since failure of venue is no longer ground for
dismissal.
"' This factor as a consideration relevant to dismissal under the common law doc-
trine of forum non conveniens is mentioned in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947), and Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W. RR., 221 P.2d 628-29 (Utah 1950).
1 2 Supra p. 149.
" Supra pp. 143-44.
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as the courts continue to recognize mere presence coupled with
service of process within the State-"transient jurisdiction"-as a basis
of acquiring in personam jurisdiction.'0 4 A major purpose of this
section is to deal with such situations by providing the defendant
with an opportunity to have the case tried in a more convenient
jurisdiction outside the State-one which has some meaningful re-
lationship to the cause of action or to himself-by affecting a trans-
fer.165 The conditions imposed are simply to assure the plaintiff
that defendant will not take advantage of this opportunity by mov-
ing to have the case dismissed for reasons not on the merits when
it is recommenced in the convenient formu.
Section 2704.07166 is a key section. It lists a series of factors
of a kind which the trial judge may examine in order to determine
whether a particular place would be a "convenient forum" for
purposes of transfer or retention. Most of them are similar to those
mentioned by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Gulf
Oil Co. v. Gilbert,167 treating of the common law doctrine of forum
non conveniens. The section makes clear that the list is not in-
tended to be exhaustive. There are other similar factors which can-
not all be foreseen but which might also be considered in determin-
ing whether or not a particular county is a convenient place for
trial. Furthermore, no attempt is made to assign weights to the
enumerated factors. It is up to the judge in each case to make a
determination based upon a sound discretion. The only limitation
imposed is that in overcoming the presumption of convenience set
forth in 2704.03, the balance of convenience must "preponderate
heavily" against the presumptively convenient county and in favor
of another forum.168 Lastly, there is no attempt to clarify the mean-
ing of each of the listed factors beyond what is already obvious in
their statement. In different contexts the various factors are quite
likely to be given different interpretations as well as different
weights. In essence, therefore, they stand as a suggestive checklist.
... Transient jurisdiction is provided for in the proposals in this paper. Proposed
§ 2702.02 (4), supra p. 140. But see Ehrenzweig.
Compare Wis. STAT. ANN., § 262.19 (Supp. 1967).
Supra pp. 149-50.
z" 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See also the interesting discussion of the relevant factors
in Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W. R.., 221 P.2d 628 (Utah 1950).
' It is suggested that the burden of establishing a case either for intra. or inter-
state transfer under these proposed statutes ought to be less than that applicable to a
dismissal under the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Cf. Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) and J. MooRE & H. FINK, JuDitAL CODE PAMPHLEt
604 (1966).
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An important feature built in to this chapter is the right of the
trial judge to effect transfer on his own motion as well as on the mo-
tion of defendant. Ordinarily, in a case where convenience is mainly
a matter of concern to the parties themselves-touching the effective
administration of justice only tangentially-the court ought not to
effect transfer if defendant does not himself request it. There are
situations, however, where important factors relating to the effec-
tive administration of justice are also present (they may be the
same factors) in great degree, as where there is substantial calendar
congestion and where the suit has little or no relationship to the
forum, but where defendant does not choose to move for transfer.
In these instances the judge ought to transfer the case on his own
initiative. Of course, he should never use the transfer power merely
to rid himself of a difficult or unpopular cause; to do so would
constitute an abuse of discretion. Occasionally, plaintiff will dis-
cover after suit is commenced that the forum is inconvenient. This
discovery may occur during or after pre-trial discovery, during or
after the pre-trial conference, or during trial. Under the philosophy
of this.chapter there is no good reason why plaintiff himself should
not be able to move for transfer." 9 Of course, since plaintiff had
the right to select the forum in the first place, the court should not
effect the transfer in. such a case unless the reasons in support thereof
are substantial. The court should also be wary of a plaintiff who
starts a case in an inconvenient forum and then requests transfer
with harassment or delay as a motive.
Trial attorneys will recognize the possibility, suggested above,
that some judges will transfer a case for base motives. If the trans-
feree judge feels that the transfer was improper, he may be tempted
to retransfer the case to the original court. This, of course, might
engender a game of ping-pong between two judges, leaving the
plaintiff's cause as the hapless ball bouncing back and forth between
the two courts. In order to avoid this possibility section 2704.10110
prohibits a re-transfer unless the transferee judge finds that the
transferor judge abused his discretion in ordering the transfer in
in the first place. Even if such a finding is made, the case cannot be
re-transferred for trial to the judge who ordered the original trans-
fer if another judge is available in the same county. Hopefully, the
good faith and good sense of most Ohio judges, coupled perhaps
- Cf. 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 0.145[6.-2] at 1791 (2d ed. 1964). Kor-
bel, Plaintiff's Right to Change of Venue in Federal Courts, 38 U. Dirt. L.J. 137 (1960).
"' Supra p. 151.
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with the odium likely to attach both to a judge who has unfairly
determined that a brother judge has abused his discretion or to the
judge who in fact has abused his discretion, will bar such misuse
of this chapter except in the rarest instances. Obviously, the power
to transfer, like any of the numerous powers left to the discretion
of a judge, is based on the necessary assumption that judges will
act in good faith to effectuate the policies underlying the grant of
the power.
3. Process
A major revision of OHIO REViSED CODE chapter 2703, Service of
Summons, is not necessary in order to accomplish the objectives set
forth at the beginning of this paper. Instead, revision of a few ex-
isting sections will be proposed.
2703.03 Requisites of Summons.
(1) The summons shall be issued and signed by the clerk,
and be under the seal of the court from wlich it is issued. Its
style shall be: "The State of Ohio ... county." and it shall be
dated the day it is issued. It shall be directed to the defendant
or defendants and contain the name of the party or parties
suing and the name and address of the plaintif's attorney, or if
plaintiff has no attorney, the plaintiffs address. It shall inform
the party that he has been sued, describe the nature of the re-
lief sought, inform the party of the time within which the law
requires him to answer or take such other action as may be
permitted by law, and notify him that in case of his failure to
do so judgment will be rendered against him for the relief de-
manded in the petition.
(2) No action shall be dismissed, and no summons shall be
quashed for defects, irregularities or omissions in the summons,
the mode of service, or the return of service, unless it clearly
appears that material prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party against whom the process issued would result. Where such
defects, irregularities, or omissions do not result in such preju-
dice, the court may allow any summons or return of service to
be amended at any time and upon such terms as it deems just.171(3) If the defendant fails to appear, judgment shall not
be rendered for a larger amount than the amount demanded
in the petition, with interest, if any, and tie costs.
The word shall has been inserted to replace the word must in
paragraph (1). The purpose is to make the language of this section
consistent with an approach in which defects in process or service
will not result in dismissal of suit or quashing of service unless the
defect prejudices the substantial rights of the party served.
'-' Adapted from MICH. GEN. Cr. I. 102.3 (1963).
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The addressee of a summons under this proposal would be the
defendant rather than the sheriff. Since the main purpose of service
is notice, and since the role of the sheriff in the ordinary case is
not to arrest the defendant, but merely to give him notice, the sum-
mons need not conform to the older requirements of a common
law wvrit. 172 Furthermore, a subsequent section will permit service
by private persons without the consent of a sheriff.178 Unless a dif-
ferent form of summons were to be required in such cases, address-
ing such summonses to a sheriff would be meaningless.
This section also eliminates the present requirement that the
summons contain the amount sued for, although the nature of the
relief sought is still included. Since a copy of the petition will be
required to be served with the summons,17 4 the details of the cause
of action, including amounts, will be made available to the party
served.
Paragraph (2) is central to the proposed changes. It is designed
to insure that defects or irregularities in the summons, the mode
of service or the return will not affect the validity of the action
unless the defendant would suffer injury to his substantial rights.
Essentially, the defendant is entitled only to notice of the action and
a reasonable opportunity to defend. So long as this constitutional
minimum is realized plaintiff should be allowed to correct the de-
fect or irregularity by amendment before or after judgment. But
even if the plaintiff does not amend, the validity of the action or a
judgment rendered therein should not be subject to direct or col-
lateral attack simply by reason of an inconsequential defect or omis-
sion.176
Paragraph (3) of this section is similar to the last sentence of
present section 2703.03. The only change made is to reflect the
fact that notice of the amount of damages sought will be found in
the ad damnum of the petition rather than in the summons.
..2 See discussion, pp. 119-20 infra.
"" Proposed § 2703.07, infra p. 166.
174 Proposed § 2703.08, infra p. 166.
' This would eliminate the distinction between "mandatory" requirements of
process and requirements which, if not fulfilled, are deemed mere irregularities. Hence-
forth, all such requirements will be correctible and should not affect jurisdiction if the
summons is calculated to give defendant notice and a reasonable opportunity to defend.
Contra, Baldine v. Klee, 39 Ohio Op.2d 295, 304-06, 224 N.X.2d 544, 548-50 (C. P.
1965). But see Shilling v. Octavio, 176 Ohio St. 123, 198 N.E.2d 52 (1964). Com-
pare the proposed section with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.58 (1953).
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2703.04 Summons may be issued outside the county in which
the action is brought.
There is no territorial limitation on the range of service
of a summons issued by a court of this State under the provi-
sions of this chapter; provided, however, that where the sole
basis of jurisdiction of a defendant is his physical presence with-
in this State, defendant must be personally served in the county
within this State in which he is found.' 7 0
Current section 2703.04177 has been a source of great and un-
founded confusion. In effect it makes validity of service of process
in a county other than the one in which the action was brought de-
pend upon the propriety of venue in the place where the action
was brought. 7 8 There is no reason, however, why there should be
any territorial limits on the place where a summons may be served.
The purpose of summons is notice. 7 9 If a valid basis of jurisdiction
exists and if venue is proper-and these are matters best handled by
separate provisions of the code-then adequate notice may be given
anywhere, within or without the State. The only possible exception
is the case of jurisdiction based solely on defendant's presence with-
in the State, where personal service within the State serves to bring
defendant within the jurisdiction of the court as well as to give him
notice. This exception is provided for in the proposal.
If defendant desires to object to venue, jurisdiction or the
validity of service he is not precluded from doing so under this
proposal. The major change is that, except for the noted exception,
being served outside the county in which suit is commenced will
not provide an independent basis for quashing service or dismissing
the action.
The second part of the current section, providing in effect for
venue of an action against the maker, acceptor or drawer of an
instrument, is entirely eliminated. It has no place in the chapter
dealing with service of summons, and is adequately dealt with by
"', Adapted from Mi. Gm',. CT. R. 105.9 (1963). Cf. Omo R v. CODE ANN.
§ 2325.03 (1953), which allows a judgment to be reopened up to five years after it
has been rendered if service was made by publication and if defendant can show, to the
court's satisfaction, that he had no actual notice of the action.
'1 Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2703.04 (Page 1953) reads in part:
When the action is rightly brought in any county, according to sections
2307.32 to 2307.40, inclusive, of the Revised Code, a summons may be issued
to any other county against one or more of the defendants at the plaintifFs
request ....
ITS See notes 116 and 136 supra.
' See text supra pp. 120-21, 127-29.
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general provisions in the venue chapter.18 0 There is no intention in
deleting the second paragraph either to make any substantive
changes in the rights of persons holding cognovit notes, or to make
it easier to sue on a note in an inconvenient county.
2703.07 Service of Summons.
The summons shall be served by any person of suitable
age and discretion who is not a party nor an officer or employee
of a corporate party.lsl When it is served by a person other than
a sheriff, or when the service is made out of this State, the re-
tuin must be verified by oath.
Again; since the primary contemporary purpose of service is to
bring notice of suit home to defendant, it is not necessary that
service be made by an officer or his designate. This change allows
service to be made by "any person of suitable age and discretion 82
who is not a party nor an officer or employee of a corporate party."
This limitation plus the requirement that such person, if not a
sheriff, verify the'return by oath should minimize the danger of
fraud. There is nothing unique about a provision of this kind in
modern American jurisprudence.183
2703.08 Manner of Service and return.
Service shall be made at any time before the return day,
(1) by delivering a copy of the summons, with the indorsements
thereon, and a copy of the petition, to the defendant personal-
ly; (2) by leaving copies at his usual place of residence; (3) if
the defendant is a partnership sued in its company name, by
leaving a copy of the summons and the petition at its usual
place of doing business, or with any member of such partner-
ship or (4) in any other manner permitted in the Revised Code.
The return shall be made at the time mentioned in the sum-
mons, and the time and manner of service shall be stated on the
summons. Failure to make proof of service does not affect the
validity of the service.
The major change in this section is to require a copy of the
petition to be served with the summons. Since a copy of the peti-
Proposed § 2704.03, supra pp. 147-48.
Adapted from MacH. GEN. Cr. IL 103(1) (1963).
This should be construed liberally to permit service by anyone old enough ind
intelligent enough to comprehend the nature and importance of his task. Due regard to
problems of "sewer service" might require some additional safeguards to be written into
Chap. 2703. See Note, Abuse of Process. Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J. or LAW & Soc,
PROBs. 17 (1967).
' See, e.g., Bush v. Meacham, 53 Mich. 574, 19 N.W. 192 (1884). According
to the Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision, Californi, Iowa, Illinois,
Minnesota, New York, Oregon and Wisconsin have comparable provisions. See JoiNT
Comm. oN M Hc. PROCEDuRAL REvSION, FINAL Rm'. Pt. III, at 9 (1960).
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tion must be filed with the clerk in order to commence the suit,184
the requirement that a copy be served on defendant should work
no hardship on plaintiff. On the other hand, it should guarantee
the defendant fuller and more effective notice than he is entitled
to under current practice. This requirement is similar to that re-
quired in other jurisdictions 85 and, by local rules, in Ohio.
The other changes in this section are minor. The word must
is changed to shall in order to emphasize that a failure to make a
return within the time mentioned in the summons or to state the
manner of- service in the summons will not result in a mandatory
dismissal. This objective is also supported by the addition of the
sentence which provides: "Failure to make proof of service does
not affect the validity of the service," and by the provisions of pro-
posed section 2703.03 (2), supra.
Subparagraph (4) takes account of the fact that the OHIo RFV.
CODE contains provisions for service of process in specific ac-
tions or in specific courts which may differ from the methods set
forth herein. It is not the intention here to repeal all such provisions.
For the most part the specific provisions will tend to be more restric-
tive than those set forth here. So long as the specific provisions are
constitutional, however, there is no reason why they should not co-
exist with the provisions of this chapter or why an attorney may not
use either method unless the specific provision is expressly made
exclusive.
2703.12 Service upon a non-resident.28 6
(1) When the defendant is a foreign corporation, foreign
partnership or other foreign association having a managing
agent in this State, the service may be upon such agent;
(2) When the defendant is a foreign corporation, foreign
partnership or other foreign association, whether or not it has a
managing agent in this State, service may be upon the president,
vice-president, secretary, treasurer or other principal officer of
such corporation, partnership or association by sending true and
attested copies of the summons and petition to such officer by
registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the last
known principal office of such corporation, partnership or asso-
ciation. The registered or certified mail return receipt shall be
attached to and made a part of the return of service.
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2703.01 (Page 1953).
See FE. R rv. P. 4(d); MxcL GEx. Cr. IL 105.1 (1963).
This section should render Omo REv. CODE § 2307.383 (Page 1953), relating
to service of process on nonresidents in actions brought under the "long-arm" statute,
unnecessary.
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(3) Where the defendant is a nonresident natural person,
service may be made upon him by sending true and attested
copies of the summons and petition to such person by registered
or certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed to his last and usual
place of abode. The registered or certified mail return receipt
shall be attached to and made a part of the return of service.
The purpose of the major changes to this section in sub-para-
graphs (2) and (3) are to permit service upon nonresident indi-
viduals, corporations, partnerships and other associations by regis-
tered or certified mail. Obviously service outside the State in this
manner will not confer jurisdiction over a non-resident who is not
amenable to jurisdiction. But if the defendant is otherwise amenable
to the court's jurisdiction-as where he has sufficient minimum con.
tacts with the State-then service by registered or certified mail is as
likely to give him the notice which is his due as any other method.18 7
There is no good reason for retaining the current dual requirement
that where the cause of action accrued within the State-an irrele-
vant consideration for the purposes of this section-the summons
must be served on an officer or employee and also sent to the prin-
cipal office of the corporation.""'
This proposed change should obviate the use of notice by pub-
lication where a nonresident defendant's residence or principal of-
fice, if not a natural person, is known. It should be noted that under
present law, notice of suit by mail is required even in case of notice
by publication where the residence of the defendant is known. 180
2703.20 Service upon executor or administrator of operator or
owner of motor vehicle; service upon infant operators
and owners.
In any civil suit or proceeding in the courts of this State,
based upon the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle, aris-
ing out of, or by reason of, any accident or collision in which
such motor vehicle is involved, where the operator or owner dies
prior to the commencement of the action, service of process may
be made on the executor or administrator of such operator or
owner in the same manner and on the same notice as is provided
in the case of an operator or owner. Where an action has been
commenced by service on an owner or operator who dies there-
after, the court must allow the action to be continued against
"' See Comment, Personal Service of Process-An Outdated Concept, 28 U. PITT,
L. REv. 319 (1966).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.12 (Page 1953).
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.16 (Page 1953). Cl. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2703.19 (Page 1953) which now permits personal service outside of the state if
service may be made by publication.
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his executor or administrator upon motion with such notice as
the court deems proper. Where the operator or owner of such
motor vehicle is an infant, service shall be made upon the infant
only, and service upon the persons named in section 2703.18
of the Revised Code shall not be required.
The main provisions of this section in its current form should
be repealed. Service upon nonresident operators or owners of motor
vehicles or resident operators or owners who become non-residents
or conceal their presence, in cases where the action arises out of an
automobile accident or collision within the State, is amply provided
for by other sections' 90 There is no longer any reason for a separate
provision for service in auto cases, just as there is no reason for a
separate provision for personal jurisdiction in such cases. The ap-
proach in the current law--that the defendant appoints the Secre-
tary of State agent for service of process and that summons must first
be served on the Secretary of State-is anomalous. The fictional
theory of "implied consent" to service which formerly required the
fictional appointment of an agent is no longer part of the juris-
prudence of due process.' 9 ' By repealing this section we lose no
benefits, but the Secretary of State is taken out of the useless business
of accepting and forwarding service of process.
However, the section of present section 2703.20 which provides
for service upon the executors or administrators of a deceased owner
or operator and for service upon an infant owner or operator is re-
tained and broadened to include residents as well as nonresidents.
While it can be argued that jurisdiction and service upon executors
and administrators are already provided for by the broad definition
of "persons" in the proposed jurisdiction section'9 - and the survival
statute 93, so that these provisions are unnecessary (except as to the
part dealing with service upon infants), it will do no harm to keep
such provisions in the "service" chapter and may serve purposes of
clarification. If such provisions are to be retained, however, they
should not necessarily apply only to nonresident executors and ad-
ministrators, but should be equally applicable to residents. Similarly,
See proposed §§ 2703.08, 2703.12, 2703.23 and Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2703.10, 2703.14 (Page 1953).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Proposed § 2702.01, supra p. 139.
OHIo REv. GODE ANN. § 2305.21 (Page 1953) See lso OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2311.21 (revivor of actions), 2125.01 (wrongful death).
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there is no need to limit their application to accidents or collisions
occurring within this State.
2103.21 Service ,upon executor or administrator of owners and
other operators of aircraft; service upon infant owners and
operators.
In any civil suit or proceeding in the courts of this State,
based upon the operation or ownership of an aircraft, and aris-
ing out of, or by reason of any damage, accident or injury in
which such aircraft is involved, where the pilot, operator, legal
or equitable owner, lessor, or lessee dies prior to the commence-
ment of the action, service of process may be made on the excu-
tor or administrator of such pilot, operator, legal or equitable
owner, lessor, or lessee in the same manner and on the same no-
tice as is provided in the case of an operator or owner. Where
an action has been commenced by service upon a defendant who
dies thereafter, the court must allow the action to be continued
against his executor or administratbr upon motion with such
notice as the court deems proper. Where the pilot, operator,
legal or equitable owner, lessor, or lessee of such aircraft is an
infant, service in the manner provided in this section shall be
made upon the infant only and service upon the persons named
in section 2701.13 of the Revised Code is not required.
The proposed amendments to this section are the same as pro-
posed for section 2703.20, supra, and for the same reasons.
2703.21 Fee for service of process.
[Repeal is recommended.]
This section provided for a fee to the Secretary of State for re-
ceiving service and forwarding notice to defendant under current
section 2703.20 and 2703.201. The proposed revisions, above, would
eliminate such service, thus making this section unnecessary. 1"4
Repeal of this section would allow current section 2703.201 to be
renumbered consecutively-section 2703.21,
2703.22 Extension to be granted; Interpretation of process pro-
visions.
In any action the court may order such continuance or exten-
sion of time as is necessary to afford the defendant reasonable
opportunity to appear and defend the action.
The provisions relating to process in this and other chapters
in the Revised Code shall be so construed as to uphold the
validity of service if notice to defendant was calculated to af-
ford a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend the action
and if any defects in the process, service or return do not other-
wise affect the substantial rights of any party.
'" See also note 186 supra.
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There is no reason why the current rule, section 2703.22, should
permit continuances only in situations in which a nonresident de-
fendant is involved in a motor vehicle or aircraft accident. Under
the long-arm statute there are many other situations in which a
nonresident defendant might be served and require additional time
to prepare an answer and defense. Furthermore, there are situations
in which a resident defendant might require additional time. The
proposed revision would give the court discretion in any case to
grant a continuance or extension if it finds such is necessary to pro-
vide defendant with a reasonable opportunity to appear and de-
fend.195
The second paragraph of the proposed revision emphasizes
again that process merely serves to comply with due process require-
ments of notice calculated to provide defendant a reasonable op-
portunity to defend the case. The failure of courts in the past to
notice general statutory admonitions favoring a liberal nontechnical
construction of procedural rules suggests that repetition of this rule
of construction at strategic places throughout procedural chapters,
such as this one, might serve a useful purpose.
2708.28 Service of writs and process by mail.
In addition to the methods of service and return of writs
provided by law, the judge of the court of common pleas and
probate judge in each of the counties of the state or the judge
of any municipal court, by rule or upon motion in any case,
may provide for service of writs or process by registered or
certified mail, and for the service of persons summoned for jury
duty by registered or certified mail.
(1) When provisions for service by mail, registered or certi-
fied, are made pursuant to this section, a return of the sheriff,
or other officer or person permitted by law to serve said writ or
process, that a true copy of the writ or process and the petition
was deposited in the mail, registered or certified, shall be proof
of residence service at the address on the envelope containing
such writ or process and the petition; provided that such resi-
dence is the correct residence address of the party to be served,
that such envelope is not returned to the postal authorities as
undelivered, and that, in a case where the mailing is executed
by a person other than a sheriff or bailiff, the return is made
under oath.
(2) In the case of a corporation, domestic or foreign, or a
partnership, or an insurance company, a return of the sheriff
" The addition of the words "or extension of time" is designed to make dear
that more time may be granted to answer. Traditionally, continuance has been defined
as the adjournment or postponement of the trial of an action.
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or other officer or person permitted by law to serve said writ or
process that a true copy of the writ or process and the petition
was deposited in the mail, enclosed in an envelope, registered or
certified, addressed to the corporation, partnership, or insurance
company at its principal office or place where it regularly re-
ceives mail, shall be proof of service; provided that such address
is a principal office of the corporation, partnership, or insurance
company, or the place where the corporation, partnership, or
insurance company regularly receives mail, that such envelope
is not returned by the postal authorities undelivered, and that
in a case where the mailing is executed by a person other than
sheriff or bailiff, the return is made under oath.
(3) The court in which any action is commenced may, in
its discretion, allow service to be made upon defendant in any
other manner which is reasonably calculated to give him actual
notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, if an
order permitting such service is entered before service of proc.
ess is made upon good cause shown.
(4) In any case a claimant requesting service by sheriff or
bailiff shall be entitled thereto.
The changes in this section are designed to allow a court, even
without the passage of a court rule (as required in section 2703.23
as now written), to allow service by mail in a particular case upon
motion of the plaintiff. 196 There is no sharp cleavage with the past in
this proposal since it has for some time been possible to serve by
mail in the case of nonresident motorists and even in the case of
nonresident corporations. Furthermore, there is no reason why a
court cannot do in a particular case what the courts may now do by
court rule.
A second change is to require a copy of the petition to be in-
cluded with the writ or summons. This will conform this section
to other proposals made earlier. It should impose no hardship on
plaintiff.
Third, the section is changed to reflect the recommendation
that private persons as well as officers be allowed as a matter of
course to serve process. When they do, however, they should be re-
quired to swear to the correctness of their return.
Fourth, in regard to service by mail on a corporation, the ad-
dress used should be a principal office of the corporation, rather
than merely "its office," in order to enhance the likelihood that
the notice will be brought home to the officials charged with the
' The requirement of registered or certified mail rather than ordinary mail should





Fifth, the provision currently in section 2703.23 that: "In any
case a person requesting service by sheriff or bailiff shall be entitled
thereto," has been changed to make it clear that only a claimant
can make such request, and not a defendant. If the defendant
doubts the authenticity of the summons and petition he is in a
position to check with the clerk of court to determine whether a
praecipe has been issued and a petition filed. Such checking would
not constitute a general appearance. 197
A comparison between the requirements of section 2703.12 and
this section is also worth noting. That section provides for mail
service upon nonresidents without a prior motion or court rule.
The names and addresses for such service are specified in more de-
tail than in proposed section 2703.22. And, unlike section 2703.22,
section 2703.12 applies only to service on non-residents. It seems
clear that a complete revision of this chapter would require a con-
solidation of section 2703.12 and section 2703.22 into one section
dealing with service by mail. For the purpose of this paper, however,
the two sections can coexist without causing inordinate confusion.
Finally, subparagraph (3) is a general, catch-all provision which
is designed to give the court discretion to permit other nonspecified
methods of service in cases where the regularly available means of
service prove inadequate.1 98 There will probably be few situations
in which service by publication or service by mail will not be ade-
quate or convenient from plaintiff's point of view. But the wide
variety of situations which can arise and the rapid development of
new media of communication suggest that the courts should be
given the power to permit a novel method of service in a particular
case if plaintiff can establish a good reason why such method should
be used. Thus, for example, the court might permit service by tele-
gram if the nature of the plaintiff's claim required haste. The court
might also substitute in such a case a brief statement of the nature
of the claim for the general requirement that defendant receive a
copy of the petition with the summons, since sending a copy of the
petition by wire might be inordinately expensive.
The requirement of "good cause shown" is deliberately left
vague in order to provide flexibility and to leave broad discretion
in the judge; it ought not to be given a niggardly interpretation.
Cf. Litsinger Sign Co. v. American Sign Co., 11 Ohio St2d 1, 227 N.E.2d
609, 621-22 (1967).
I Adapted from MicR. GE. Cr. P. 105.8 (1963).
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III. CONCLUSION
Inevitably anyone attempting to revise a body of law has to
confront some choices between rigid rules which promote certainty
overall but create hardship in some individual cases, and flexible
rules which promote justice in all cases but create uncertainty in
some. If the body of law being revised is substantive in nature, and
if the ability of citizens to conform their conduct to it depends upon
their awareness and understanding of it, then certainty and predicta-
bility become dominant considerations; one will avoid unpleasant
entanglements even with a harsh or unfair rule if he is aware of the
consequences of violating it. Rules of practice and procedure, how-
ever, are rules of conduct for lawyers and judges involved in the
adversary system. Ordinary citizens do not and ordinarily cannot
take such rules into account in planning their activities. When pro-
cedural rules are complicated or arbitrary in their operation, or
when they are not capable of being understood and simply applied
by lawyers, the fact that they are certain may create serious in-
justice for litigants who have no real opportunity to protect them-
selves against their operation. Furthermore, where the rules, as cer-
tain as they may be, no longer serve any useful purpose-when the
reasons which gave them life have expired-the injustice they may
cause when rigidly applied to a litigant's case is absolutely intoler-
able. Unfortunately, such injustice has not been absent from the
application of the Ohio procedural rules which are dealt with in
this paper.
In general, the proposals made here are designed to eliminate
rules which serve no contemporary purpose and, as to other rules,
to favor flexibility over rigidity and arbitrariness. Thus, this article
proposes revised rules wherein: (1) the violation of rules which at
best serve only administrative convenience or do not go to the
merits of the cause will rarely form the basis for a final dismissal;
(2) actions will be tried in convenient forums and will usually be
transferred rather than dismissed if they are brought initially in an
inconvenient forum; and (3) plaintiffs who bring actions in courts
where personal jurisdiction is questionable will be given an oppor-
tunity to have their cases transferred to a convenient forum in
which jurisdiction is clearly present. However, since "fair play and
substantial justice," the "balance of convenience," or "service calcu-
lated to give defendant notice of the action and a reasonable op-
portunity to defend" are the touchstones laid down by the Supreme
Court, and since the essential purpose of venue is to have cases tried
(Vol. 29
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in fair and convenient forums, it has not seemed desirable, and is
perhaps not possible, to lay out in advance and with precision all
the factual patterns which might arise. Nonetheless, flexible rules,
reasonably administered, will tend to insure fairness and as much
certainty as can be expected within the developing pattern of law
in this area. To the extent that uncertainty becomes a problem, if it
ever does, it will be purely a lawyer's problem, and not a problem
of injustice to the litigant.
There is some urgency in the suggestions made in this paper.
The judicial system is an elaborate institution, very expensive to
maintain. The cost-conscious public is not likely to continue to bear
the rising expense if the system is seen to breed delay and injustice,
especially if attractive alternatives are offered. Such alternatives have
already appeared on the horizon; they run the gamut from arbitra-
tion to administrative agencies to far-ranging plans for taking cer-
tain classes of litigation-such as automobile accident cases-out of
the judicial system. Perhaps some of these alternatives are clearly
superior to the common law method of settling disputes; if so, they
may be adopted without regard to any possible improvements in
judicial procedure and administration. But if not, and if the judicial
system is to emerge unscathed from the competition with these
alternatives, it must be made as modern, as fair in its operation and
as efficient as it is capable of being made. Thus, the proposals made
here-which may seem at first blush overly venturesome to lawyers
who have known only the present rules-are essentially conservative
in their objectives.
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